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INTRODUCTION
No other issue is of greater importance to the European Union today than
whether and how Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) will be attained. If
EMU can be successfully achieved, not only will it produce substantial
economic and monetary benefits, but its success will have great political and
psychological significance. A strong EMU is apt to promote further efforts
toward a federal union. Conversely, if EMU fails or if there are protracted
delays in its attainment, if too many Member States remain permanently outside
the monetary union, or if some states suffer serious economic and social
disruption as a consequence of joining the monetary union, then such shortfalls
will adversely affect the present level of political integration in the European
Union.
The title of this article represents a pun, but a pun with a point that responds
to the tensions between these dreams of EMU's success and fears of its failure.
The emu is a large Australian bird, but, like the better-known ostrich, the emu
does not fly. However, it can run very fast. The point is, that during the early
stages of planning for the EMU there were some very high-flying aspirations for
what it might attain, and what its attainment might mean for the political future
of the European Union. Since then, these aspirations have been considerably
chilled by political and economic realities. Still, one can reasonably hope that
when the EMU structure is in place, it, like the Australian emu, will run very
fast-that, while it may not achieve the highest goals imagined by some
proponents, the EMU will function well at a more modest but realistic level.
The goal of an Economic and Monetary Union, sometimes also called the
European Monetary Union, has been a central preoccupation of the European
Community for many years. In fact, the idea of substantial economic and
monetary coordination dates to the origin of the Community, and a proposal for
a monetary union was advanced as early as 1971. In its description of the
current monetary union plan and progress toward its attainment, this Article will
deal initially in Part I with the goals which have inspired the current efforts to
attain EMU, namely the perceived benefits of an integrated Community
monetary system regulated by a central bank system, together with a single
Community currency, eliminating trans-border currency costs and promoting
further market integration within the common market.
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Next, this Article will outline the historical development of EMU, describing
in Part II the initial 1970 plans and the success of the 1979 European Monetary
System. Part III continues this historical review with a sketch of the vital
catalyst, the 1989 Delors Report, the succeeding Commission studies, and the
work of the 1990-1991 Rome Intergovernmental Conference that prepared the
text of the Treaty provisions on EMU. Also necessary to situate EMU in its
historical context is Part IV which deals with the early progress toward free
movement of capital, a goal now attained through a 1988 directive and EC
Treaty Article 73, introduced in 1994. Free movement of capital is an essential
pre-condition for EMU.
The core of this Article lies in Parts V and VI. Part V sets out the three stage
approach to EMU, pragmatically gauged for progressive development, and
describes in some detail the role, powers and structure of the European Central
Bank and the European System of Central Banks. Part VI builds on this by
reviewing a series of constitutional and legal issues concerning the Treaty
structure, notably the need for independence of the central bank system, the
"democratic deficit" represented by the meager role accorded to the European
Parliament, the essential need for effective judicial review to achieve a "rule of
law" for EMU, and the question whether the central bank system ought to work
to achieve high employment in addition to trying to achieve its Treaty goal of
price stability.
The final Parts of this Article move to the current scene. Part VII describes
the second stage of progress toward EMU, 1994-1998, and the current role of
the European Monetary Institute. This Part's most important feature is its
analysis of the complex monetary convergence criteria which Member States
must satisfy in order to join in the third stage of EMU, and its evaluation of
current progress of the states in that regard. Part VIII sets out the key policy
decisions taken by the European Council in 1995-1997 to further the
development of EMU, and describes some related legislative measures, notably
the recent regulations that embody the "Stability and Growth Pact." The final
Part covers the plans and studies for the new single currency, the euro, and
some essential legislation to enable its introduction.
I. THE GOALS OF AN ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION
The attainment of an Economic and Monetary Union will transform the
European Community,' and its over-arching structure, the European Union,2 in a
' The European Community, often called the EC or simply the Community and formally
designated as the European Economic Community (EEC) until 1993, was created by the Treaty
Establishing the European Economic Community, signed at Rome (and hence often called the Rome
Treaty) on March 25, 1957. 298 U.N.TS. 11.
2 The Treaty on European Union [TEU], signed at Maastricht on February 7, 1992 (and hence
often called the Maastricht Treaty), effective November 1, 1993, created a structure called the
European Union. The European Community, renamed as such by the TEU, is by far its most
important component part, but the European Union also includes two other so-called -pillars:"
Article J on Common Foreign and Security Policy, and Article K on Cooperation in Justice and
Home Affairs. The TEU, together with the Treaty Establishing the European Community [EC Treaty]
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more fundamental manner than any development since the substantial
achievement of the internal market program. Indeed, the 1995 Green Paper on
the Introduction of the Single Currency depicted EMU as the "logical and
essential complement" to the common market.' The recent impetus toward EMU
undoubtedly stems in large measure from the generally satisfactory progress to
date in attaining a single market.
The goal of EMU has three components: (1) an integrated Community
monetary system; (2) an institutional structure, with a European Central Bank at
its center, (3) a single currency, the euro, replacing present national currencies in
all the participating Member States. Each will be described in greater detail
later, but some preliminary notes should be made.
An integrated Community monetary system with a European Central Bank at
its core offers the prospect of both greater monetary stability and a large
monetary marketplace. As will be seen later, the Member States have followed
sharply different national economic and monetary policies in the past. The
necessity to meet rather high economic and monetary standards in order to
participate in the monetary union has compelled virtually all the Member States
to adopt much stricter monetary policies, in effect, putting their financial
households in order. If, as can be safely assumed, the European Central Bank
adopts stable monetary policy programs and has the power to implement them,
with a minimum of political interference from Member State governments and
Community institutions, then the prospect is one of a more solid monetary
structure for all the participating States.
Since Member States participating in the monetary union will no longer be
able to resort easily to deficit financing, their rate of economic growth is apt to
be steadier, and they will be more likely to attract international and domestic
investment. A reduction in deficit spending and a lowering of long-term debt
will bring the corollary of less frequent need to float state loans and the
obtention of lower interest rates for state debt. The private sector will benefit
because financial and commercial enterprises should be able to float bonds and
borrow long-term funds in a more liquid market, again at lower rates.
With regard to the adoption of the single currency, the euro, the Commission
estimates that use of a single currency will save the Community annually around
20-25 billion ECU, or approximately 0.3-0.4% of GDP, through the elimination
of currency-related transaction costs (i.e., the expense of changes in currency
when transacting commercial and personal affairs across frontiers within the
in its present form, is printed in its entirety in 1992 OJ. (C 224) 1 and 31 LL.M. 247 (1992). The
provisions on economic and monetary union are an integral part of the EC Treaty. Hence, throughout
the text of this article, reference will usually be made to the European Community, or the
Community, rather than to the European Union.
3 European Commission, Green Paper on the Practical Arrangements for the Introduction of the
Single Currency, COM (95) 333 final (May 31, 1995) [hereinafter Green Paper]. The Commission
follows British nomenclature in designating as a "green paper" any important document intended for
study, reflection and comment, rather than for immediate action. See infra Part IX for further
discussion of the Green Paper.
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Community). 4 Business will no longer need currency options, futures or
insurance to hedge against shifts in national currency value when transacting
trans-border financial and commercial affairs within the Community. On the
other hand, as planning for the introduction of the euro moves ahead, private
financial sector and other sources are estimating more precisely the transition
costs in abandoning current currencies and shifting to a single currency. The
final cost is probably incalculable, but it may well represent tens of billions of
dollars-perhaps over a hundred billion dollars in the aggregate. In addition,
there will be serious adjustment shocks when governments, financial institutions,
businesses and private parties must cope with the change-over to an unfamiliar
single currency. It is certainly within the realm of possibility that transition costs
will exceed savings in transaction costs during the initial years of monetary
union.
But there is a further and more important economic benefit flowing from a
single currency, namely, the achievement of far greater price and cost
transparency in all trans-border financial, commercial and private transactions.5
Thus, purchasers of raw materials and supplies, intermediate distributors of
products, persons providing services, and consumers of goods, services or credit
will all be able easily and quickly to compare prices or expenses when dealing
with domestic and foreign parties. This will considerably facilitate the business
operations of large financial institutions and multinational corporations, which
have, not surprisingly, become strong supporters of the efforts to attain EMU.
Yet overall, smaller enterprises may derive greater benefit than larger ones from
this increased price and cost transparency, since smaller enterprises tend to have
less expertise in conducting trans-border affairs.
Prospects of greater market integration, especially in the financial services
sector, are bound to lead to enhanced merger and acquisition activity, resulting
in the disappearance of many smaller or less efficient enterprises. The
Commission estimates that several Member States are "over-banked,"
possessing too many banks or other financial institutions in proportion to their
general population and overall level of commercial activity. The wave of trans-
border and domestic financial sector mergers and acquisitions that increased
sharply in 1996-1997 may be expected to continue. Although manifestly leading
to a more efficient financial sector, this process will also produce far more
powerful market players, whose conduct will have to be carefully monitored by
Community and national competition authorities, as well as by financial
regulatory bodies.
On the global monetary stage, a successful EMU will also play a leading role.
Use of the euro for international trade and as a reserve currency will be far
more substantial than is the present use of individual national currencies, even
4 Id. at 3.
5 For a more detailed discussion of the single currency's economic benefits in the "elimination of
information costs and of incentives for price discrimination" and in "dynamic efficiency gains," see
Daniel Gros & Niels Thygesen, Towards Monetary Union in the European Community: Why and
How, in European Monetary Integration 95, 102-03 (Paul Welfens ed., Springer 2d ed. 1994).
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the German marL Moreover, the existence of a European Central Bank with a
mandate for price stability and a strong currency is quite apt to promote the
desirability of the use of the euro in international transactions. The euro may
become a serious competitor for the U.S. dollar in global transactions, especially
in the international oil and commodities markets and in trans-border credit and
financial operations.
Finally, a successful EMU will have a great impact on the political aspect of
the European Community. One of the most essential types of sovereign power,
namely the control over monetary policy, will be transferred to a Community
institution. It is true that, as we shall see in Part V, the institution, the European
Central Bank, will be independent of the traditional Community political
institutions, namely the Commission, Council and Parliament. Nevertheless,
power over monetary policy will rest with a Community entity. Such a transfer
of vital power necessarily diminishes the role of national governments to a
significant degree.
The transfer of monetary power to the European Central Bank and the
creation of a single common currency are bound also to produce significant
psychological consequences. Citizens of the Member States will perceive more
readily the extent, importance and hopefully the value of European integration.
Replacement of national currency and coins by the euro will represent a far
more meaningful symbol of Union integration than the current European
passport or the Union flag can ever be. Migrant workers and professionals in
particular will see tangible benefits from the use of the euro, since they will
more readily be able to compare income levels and the cost of living in different
Member States, as well as to transfer funds to a new place of residence or back
to their home or family.
Thus far, it has been assumed that the Community will successfully attain
Economic and Monetary Union. Although the prospect for its success are
increasingly bright, this is not a guaranteed result. To some degree, the plan for
EMU represents an audacious gamble. If successful, the economic, monetary and
political benefits will be enormous. But if the progress is stalled, if too many
Member States remain permanently outside of EMU, or if a monetary shock
destabilizes the entire structure once created, the adverse impact on the
Community would be serious, perhaps very grave. American economists in
particular were initially highly skeptical of the merits of EMU and concerned
about its potential risks. While they have become less pessimistic in view of
recent progress, still it must be said that EMU does bring significant risks as
well as benefits.
The current mood in the European Community is one of guarded optimism.
As will be described in Part VII, the current prospects are that eleven Member
States will launch the monetary union in 1999, with a reasonable likelihood that
the four others will join by 2002, the date set for the introduction of the euro as
legal tender, or shortly thereafter.
Before closing this Part, a word is appropriate on the role of the highest
political leadership of the Member States, gathered together in the body
designated as the European Council. Ever since 1969, when President Pompidou
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of France took the initiative of urging summit meetings, the Heads of State and
Government of the Member States have been meeting two to four times a year
to discuss major issues confronting the Community (or the Union), setting policy
guidelines and issuing important declarations of principle. By the late 1970s,
these summit meetings became known as European Council sessions.6
With the adoption of the important series of EC Treaty amendments known as
the Single European Act, effective July 1, 1987, the European Council acquired
Treaty status.7 The current relevant provision, Article D of the Treaty on
European Union (TEU), includes the President of the Commission in the
European Council meetings of Heads of State and Governments. Article D states
the role of the European Council to be to "provide the Union with the necessary
impetus for its development and [to] define the general political guidelines
thereof." 8
The role of the European Council in deciding upon the key aspects of the
proposed structure of EMU, and in promoting its steady evolution toward reality,
has been an unusually marked one. As we shall see in later Parts, successive
meetings of the European Council have resulted in crucial policy decisions, or
achieved critical compromise breakthroughs on intransigent issues, in shaping
the progress toward EMU. Moreover, the TEU itself specifies that a number of
fundamental decisions in moving toward EMU, especially that of the designation
of the Member States that will join in its final stage in 1999, are to be taken by
the Council, the Community's principal legislative body, meeting in the unusual
composition of the Heads of State and Government, instead of its more
customary composition of finance ministers or foreign affairs ministers.
Indeed, in the prospective creation of a monetary union, not only should great
tribute be paid to the vision of Commission President Jacques Delors, but also to
the vision and political will of Chancellor Kohl of Germany and President
Mitterand of France, who together provided the principal leadership in the
planning. Also playing important roles in the political process were Prime
Ministers Dehaene of Belgium, Lubbers of The Netherlands and Gonzalez of
Spain, and more recently, President Chirac of France. Tributes should also be
paid to the less prominent but quite crucial role of the central bank governors,
such as Pohl of the Bundesbank (the German Central Bank), and Duisenberg of
the Dutch Central Bank, who, together with their staffs, provided much of the
expertise necessary in the drafting of the various treaty provisions.
6 George A. Bermann et al., Cases and Materials on European Community Law 12-13 (1993).
7 Most of the provisions of the Single European Act [SEA], effective July 1, 1987, amended the
EEC Treaty, but the description of the European Council in Title I Common Provisions, Article 2,
remained outside the EEC Treaty. The SEA is published in 1987 OJ. (L 169) 1.
8 TEU, art. D. The European Council should not be confused (as it often is by the lay public)
with the Council of the European Union, usually called the Council of Ministers, which exercises the
principal legislative role in the European Community. The basic composition, role and powers of the
Council are set out in EC Treaty, arts. 145-54. Among the best reference books describing the
institutional structure of the European Community are Trevor Hartley, The Foundations of European
Community Law (3d ed. 1994); Pierre Mathijsen, A Guide to European Union Law (6th ed. 1995);
Josephine Steiner, Textbook on EC Law (4th ed. 1994); and Stephen Weatherill & Paul Beaumont,
EC Law (2d ed. 1995).
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H. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Treaty of Rome: Economic and Monetary Coordination
It may seem a bit surprising, but in fact the initial Treaty Establishing the
European Economic Community (EEC Treaty, or Treaty of Rome) did include
the topic of economic and monetary coordination, although the idea of a
monetary union was not yet advanced. Thus, in the EEC Treaty, Title H on
Economic Policy contains several articles relevant to economic and monetary
coordination.9 Article 104 requires each Member State to "pursue the economic
policy needed to ensure the equilibrium of its overall balance of payments and
to maintain confidence in its currency, while taking care to ensure a high level
of employment and a stable level of prices." Article 105 further requires states
to "coordinate their economic policies," as well as policies "in the monetary
field." Article 106 liberalizes current transborder payments for goods and
services, and Articles 108 and 109 permit safeguard measures for states
encountering serious balance of payments difficulties.
Article 105(2) of the EEC Treaty created a body whose importance has
steadily increased over the years. This is the Monetary Committee, composed of
two representatives from each Member State and two persons appointed by the
Commission, whose role is to "review the monetary and financial situation of
the Member States and the Community," and to provide opinions and reports to
the Commission and Council. Another specialist body, the Committee of
Governors of Central Banks, was established in 1964 to facilitate contacts
among the banks and to provide advice on monetary affairs. 0.
The EEC monetary structure first assumed importance at the end of the 1960s
as the world monetary system established under the Bretton Woods accords
started to break down." In the halcyon days of the 1950s and 1960s, states'
currency exchange rates were fixed in relation to one another, and the U.S.
dollar, backed by substantial gold reserves, provided international monetary
stability. As world trade and investment expanded enormously during that
period, states became much more interdependent, both in economic and
monetary terms. Then, in the 1960s, as the economies of some states developed
far more rapidly than others, and as certain states suffered serious bouts of
inflation, balance of payments difficulties became inevitable. France, Italy, the
9 Articles 103-109 were deleted by the Treaty on European Union. In addition to the source cited
in note 1, supra, their text can be conveniently found in Consolidated Treaties Establishing the
European Communities (EC Off'i Pub. Off. 1987); and in the EEC Treaty provisions contained in
George A. Bermann, et al., European Community Law: Selected Documents (1998).
10 See Council Decision 64/300/EEC of May 8, 1964 on cooperation between central banks, 1964
OJ. (L 1206) 1.
" For a description of the Community monetary coordination during the maintenance of the
Bretton Woods accords, and its reactions to the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, see Rene
Smits, The European Central Bank-Institutional Aspects 10-14 (1997). For a detailed analysis of
the Bretton Woods system for fixed exchange rates, its breakdown, and the current floating rate
regime, see Joseph Gold, Legal and Institutional Aspects of the International Monetary Fund-
Selected Essays, Vol. 1, 74-136 (1984).
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United Kingdom and certain other states were compelled to devalue their
currencies in successive monetary crises, while Germany, The Netherlands and
Switzerland were obliged to revalue them.
The most serious monetary crisis arose when the dollar came under severe
pressure in 1971. President Nixon decided to end the gold standard on August
15, 1971, allowing the dollar to float against other currencies. The Smithsonian
Accord of December 18, 1971 institutionalized the system of floating exchange
rates.'2 However, because such rates create uncertainty and instability in long-
term financial and commercial transactions, ever since 1971 governments have
sought to find a way to return to some form of fixed, or at least relatively stable
rates.
Making use of Article 105, the Commission and Council began a series of
attempts to alleviate monetary crises in particular Member States and to
coordinate economic and monetary policy in order to achieve greater stability
within the Community. The 1969 Barre Plan, named after Raymond Barre, then
president of the central bank of France, is usually considered to have initiated
monetary coordination. In a related move, the Committee of Governors of
Central Banks agreed on February 9, 1970, to provide lines of credit to support
Member States in times of monetary crisis.
A stage-by-stage plan for attaining economic and monetary union was
presented to the Council of Ministers in October 1970 in the form of the Werner
Report, named after the Prime Minister of Luxembourg, who served as chairman
of a committee of experts representing the Commission, the Monetary
Committee, and central bank governors.13 A Council resolution endorsed the
Werner Report in general terms and resolved to develop an economic and
monetary union over a ten year period.' 4 Pursuant to this plan, Council
Regulation 907/73's established a European Monetary Cooperation Fund to
provide short-term monetary support and facilitate concerted monetary action. A
later Council Decision 74/120 urged Member States to align their economic
policies with guidelines to be issued periodically by the Council, and called on
the central banks to coordinate their monetary policies.' 6 Most Member States
entered a system to reduce exchange rate fluctuations to a narrow band,
popularly called the "snake." (The band was commonly called a "snake,"
because, when graphically depicted, it resembles an undulating wave as a
particular national currency moves above or below the pegged rate.)
12 For further discussion of the U.S. withdrawal from the gold standard and the Smithsonian
Accord, see Gold, supra note 11, at 94-98.
13 Report on the Realization by Stages of Economic and Monetary Union, Bull. EC 11-1970,
Supp. The Werner Report proposed a system of irreversible convertibility of national currencies, free
from fluctuation, regulated by a Community system of central banks modeled after the Federal
Reserve. The Report's proposal that the EEC Treaty be amended in order to achieve monetary union
did not, of course, result in any action. For further details on the Werner Report and Community
action to implement it, see Smits, supra note 11, at 15-19.
14 Bull. EC 4-1971, at 19.
1S Council Regulation 907nl3, 1973 OJ. (L 89) 2.
16 Council Decision 741120, 1974 OJ. (L 63) 16.
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Unfortunately, the energy recession of the mid-1970s and further monetary
crises in certain Member States prevented these Community measures from
becoming truly effective. Coordination efforts were reduced, rather than
enhanced, in the late 1970s. The goal of a union receded farther into the
distance.
B. The European Monetary System
In the late 1970s, the leadership of President Giscard d'Estaing of France and
Chancellor Schmidt of Germany, both former Finance Ministers, together with
Commission President Roy Jenkins, formerly the U.K. Chancellor of the
Exchequer, caused new attention to be focussed on monetary coordination and
stabilization. The European Council Meeting at Bremen in July 1978 officially
endorsed the concept of a European Monetary System (EMS), 17 which came into
force in March 1979.
Membership in the EMS is voluntary, and therefore has produced since its
inception a sort of "two-tier" Europe. The Benelux States, Denmark, France,
Germany and Italy have been members from the start. The United Kingdom
initially joined, but withdrew after a two-month run on its currency reserves, and
only joined again in October 1990. Portugal and Spain joined the EMS after
their accession in 1986, but Greece did not.
In a 1989 brochure, the Commission described the European Monetary System
as intended to achieve the following objectives:
To attain a zone of internal and external monetary stability in Europe (involving both
low inflation and stable exchange rates); to provide the framework for improved
economic policy cooperation between Member States ... ; to help to alleviate global
monetary instability through common policies vis a vis third currencies .... ,8
The Commission further described the EMS as "a pragmatic attempt to progress
along the road to economic and monetary union." 9
The European Monetary System has three basic components: an artificial
currency, the ECU; exchange rates which are permitted to fluctuate only in a
narrow band; and a system of credit and loan reserves to stabilize Member State
currencies in times of crisis.20 All three merit brief treatment.
First, the EMS created an artificial European monetary unit, the ECU, which
replaced the prior artificial unit known as the European Unit of Account
17 Bull. EC 6-1978, at 17-18.
IS European Commission, The EMS: Ten Years of Progress in European Monetary Cooperation 3
(EC Off'l Pub. Off. 1989).
19 Id.
2D Besides the description of the European Monetary System in the Commission brochure, see
supra note 18, the EMS is more fully discussed in Klaus Gretschmann et al., The European
Monetary System, in Economic and Monetary Union: Implications for National Policy Makers 27
(Klaus Gretschmann ed., 1993); Smits, supra note 11, at 20-26; and John A. Usher, The Law of
Money and Financial Services in the European Community 137-46 (1994).
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(EUA). 2' The value of the ECU is fixed as a composite of a "basket" of
Member State currencies with weighted values one to another. A macroeconomic
calculation of the proportionate size of the national economy underlying each
Member State's currency is used in allocating weights to the different currencies.
The weighted value assigned to each Member State's currency in the basket was
fixed at the outset The weighted value was then revised every five years, most
recently on September 21, 1989. To give an idea, in the 1989 revision, the
German mark was set at 30.1% of the total basket value, the French franc 19%,
the pound sterling 13%, the Italian lira 10.15%, with the other currencies set at
lower percentages. In 1994, as planning for Economic and Monetary Union
began, the "basket" was frozen at the 1989 levels, pending the final creation of
a single currency.
The European Community uses the ECU for its own budget. All revenues and
all expenditures are calculated in the form of ECUs. This enables a standard
base to be used in the calculation of budget items from year to year. The
European Investment Fund and other financial organs of the Community
likewise deal in ECUs. These institutions and the Community itself occasionally
float loans on international markets denominated in ECUs. For that matter, in
the 1980s private financial institutions began to float loans denominated in
ECUs. In the late 1980s, ECUs were often considered virtually as stable as
Eurodollars for purposes of long term financial transactions. In 1994, the
Commission estimated that there were over 200 billion ECU in private loans.?
The ECU is quoted on monetary exchanges and floats against the dollar and
other currencies-in December 1997, the ECU equaled $1.10. The ECU is, of
course, not an actual currency: there are no bills or coins denominated in ECU,
nor is the ECU used as legal tender for everyday private commercial
transactions.
The second component of the European Monetary System is its system for the
stabilization of exchange rates between the currencies of Member States
participating in the EMS. This is called the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM).
The exchange rates were fixed in 1979 at the outset of the EMS and have been
changed only at relatively infrequent intervals. A very moderate degree of
floating was initially allowed between currencies, within a band range of 2.25%
above or below the exchange rate. This band was increased to 6% for certain
Member States during periods of monetary stress or weakness-for example,
Italy was allowed to use the 6% margin until 1989, and Portugal and Spain
entered the ERM with the same 6% margin.
The functional merit of this limited rate of fluctuation around pegged rates set
for long periods of time is that it serves as a reasonably close approximation of
the fixed rates of the Bretton Woods system. This means that financial
institutions, commercial enterprises, and private investors can enter into medium
21 For a detailed discussion of the ECU, see John A. Usher, The Legal Regulation of the
European Currency Unit, 37 Int'l & Comp. LQ. 249 (1988).
2 European Commission, General Report on the Activities of the European Union 1994, at point
53 (1995) [hereinafter Commission, General Report 1994].
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and long-term transactions with a reasonable assurance that neither an
unexpected large exchange rate gain nor loss will occur at the end of the
transaction. Moreover, the requirement that Member States must maintain their
currencies within the flotation band means that Member States are encouraged to
combat inflation and to avoid deficit spending on the one hand, and to spur
investment and combat recession on the other.
The ERM's pegged exchange rate levels proved to be highly satisfactory in
practice for over a decade. Realignment of rates occurred at infrequent intervals
in the 1980s, and usually involved only two or three currencies. To give an
example, the most significant currency realignment occurred in March 1983
when the German mark rose 5.5%, several other currencies rose 1.5% to 3.5%,
and three currencies went down 2.5% to 3.5%.
The third component of the European Monetary System is a credit mechanism
by which short and medium term support can be given to Member States
encountering serious monetary troubles. The usual mode of support foreseen is
the Very Short-Term Financing (VSTF) facility, intended to provide support for
30-45 days. A reserve fund was created, composed of the equivalent of 20% of
the gold and 20% of the dollars held by each participating Member State's
central bank. This fund was initially set at 25 billion ECU. The EMS can also
provide medium term support for a maximum period of 5 years, with a loan
fund available of up to 6 billion ECUs. A Member State receiving such a loan
must reduce any deficit spending and take action to control inflation.
C. Recent Events in the EMS
Confidence in the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the EMS was badly shaken
in September 1992. Stimulated by concern that France might not ratify the
Maastricht Treaty, substantial speculation developed on the currency markets,
directed against the currencies of Member States whose economies were
perceived as weak, and in favor of the German mark. Investors perceived the
German mark as the safest long-term currency, because the German central
bank, the Bundesbank, persisted in keeping interest rates at very high levels in
order to prevent inflation from being spurred by large government expenditures
to meet the costs of German unification. Major financial interests, such as
multinational corporations and pension funds, decided that it was more prudent
to shift large volumes of capital from other currencies to the German mark.
Despite massive intervention efforts by central banks to support currencies
under attack, the pressure increased. Several Member States nearly exhausted
their currency reserves in a fruitless effort to stabilize their currency. Italy and
the United Kingdom concluded that they must temporarily withdraw from the
ERM and float their currencies, which then dropped sharply in an effective
devaluation, and Ireland and Spain instituted emergency exchange controls.
Financial observers noted that the volume of currency market activity, especially
the use of currency options on a large scale, had increased enormously since the
1970s, which made it very difficult for governments and central banks to cope
with speculative attacks on currencies.
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Predictably, Prime Minister Major urged that movement toward economic and
monetary union be delayed, while Chancellor Kohl contended that the monetary
crisis demonstrated the need to move ahead toward an EMU.
The stability which the exchange rate mechanism is supposed to provide
within the EMS, already shaken in September 1992, was even more seriously
undermined in 1992-1995. The United Kingdom continued to stay outside the
ERM, and Italy withdrew until late 1996. Although remaining within the ERM,
Spain and Portugal had to devalue their currencies four times against the mark,
cumulatively about 25%, and the Irish pound was devalued by 10% in early
1993.
Despite France's relatively healthy economic condition, the French franc
became the subject of such a severe speculative attack on "black Friday," July
29, 1993, that even massive intervention by the German and French central
banks was not sufficient to support it. The Community fimance ministers and
central bank governors were compelled to enlarge radically the fluctuation band
of the ERM from 2.25% to 15% above or below the central standard rate.
Although the exchange markets then quieted without a devaluation of the franc,
the ERM has not been able formally to return to a narrower band. Indeed, in
March 1995 a new wave of speculation, triggered by the Mexican debt crisis
and the renewed weakness of the dollar, pushed the mark substantially higher in
comparison to the franc and several other currencies.
Fortunately, since 1995 the currency markets in the Community have calmed
down and exchange rate shifts have been minor. Indeed, by the end of 1996, the
currencies of all the Member States operating within the Exchange Rate
Mechanism were well within the 2.25% fluctuation band that had prevailed in
the 1980s. Moreover, Austria, Finland and Sweden all joined the EMS (although
Sweden did not join the ERM), and Italy reentered the ERM in late 1996.
Since 1996, the general exchange rate stability has been promoted by the
parallel efforts of Member State governments to meet the criteria necessary to
join the final stage of Economic and Monetary Union, coupled with the growing
belief of financial market operators that a large majority of Member States will
in fact participate in that union. However, in mid-1997, the strong economic
performance of the U.S., together with a growing view that a single currency
would not be as strong as the mark, pushed the dollar about 20% higher vis-k-
vis the mark and other continental currencies, while the U.K. pound also rose
relative to the mark, due in part to beliefs that the pound will remain a strong
independent currency for at least some time after the commencement of the
monetary union.
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I. THE INTERNAL MARKET, THE DELORS REPORT AND THE
SHAPING OF THE ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION
A. The Internal Market Program
Although certainly the manifest success of the European Monetary System in
the late 1980s made renewed consideration of a monetary union plausible, it was
undoubtedly the success of the internal market program that provided the
greatest impetus for serious planning for EMU. To place this in its historical
perspective, the early 1980s were not a particularly happy or optimistic period in
Community history. Frequent strife between the Council and the Parliament over
budgetary and institutional issues, bitter conflicts over finances and the
agricultural policy at the level of the Council and of the European Council itself,
and a sense that national barriers to intra-EC trade were multiplying rather than
diminishing, all contributed to what was frequently characterized as
"Europessimism" or "Eurostagnation."
The European Council meeting at Dublin in December 1984, concerned by
this state of affairs, decided that the Community "should take steps to complete
the Internal Market." 23 By a fortunate coincidence in timing, a new Commission
took office in 1985, led by the dynamic, far-sighted and politically adroit
President Jacques Delors. Working in close collaboration with another politically
astute commissioner in charge of internal affairs, Lord Cockfield, and supported
by the entire Commission, they produced the famous 1985 White Paper on
Completing the Internal Market.24 The White Paper proved an almost instant
success, securing the immediate backing of the Milan European Council in June
1985, which instructed the Council to act upon the Commission White Paper
proposals.25 Thereafter, the White Paper program captured the imagination first
of industrial and financial leaders, then the media, and ultimately the public at
large.
The White Paper proved to be an extraordinarily precise and persuasive
program for legislative action. It contained a list of 279 proposals for legislation,
together with a timetable for action. Within less than seven years, by the target
date of December 31, 1992 set in the White Paper, over 95% of the complex
legislative program to complete the internal market had been adopted by the
Community institutions,2 and the Member States were well along in the process
of enacting implementing measures.
2 Bull. EC 12-1984, at 18.
24 European Commission, White Paper on Completing the Internal Market, COM (85) 310 final
(June 1985) [hereinafter White Paper]. Following the British nomenclature, the Commission refers to
documents containing a program for action as "white papers," thus distinguishing them from "green
papers," which are issued for study and comment. Compare note 3, supra. The March 1985 Brussels
European Council specifically requested the Commission study which became the White Paper. See
Bull. EC 3-1985, at 12.
2 Bull. EC 6-1985, at 14-15.
26 European Commission, Twenty-sixth General Report on the Activities of the European
Communities 1992, at point 69 (1993) [hereinafter Commission, General Report 1992]. For a more
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The extraordinary success of the internal market program naturally promoted
greater confidence within the Community institutions and within the political
leadership of the Member States as proposals for monetary union began to be
advanced. Moreover, monetary union could easily be seen, as noted before, as
the "essential and logical complement" to the internal market program.? The
achievement of a truly European marketplace could clearly never be fully
realized so long as monetary frontiers and national currencies made national
markets less accessible to products and services coming from other Member
States. The creation of a monetary union readily became the next challenge after
the progress made in developing an internal market. An integrated internal
market appeared a truncated success without the cap of a monetary union.
B. The 1989 Delors Report
Already in 1985, there was awareness of the link between the internal market
program and a monetary union. The Luxembourg Intergovernmental
Conference,28 held in the fall of 1985, produced an important series of EEC
Treaty amendments called the Single European Act (SEA), 29 whose principal
purpose was to add Article 8a (renumbered by the TEU as Article 7a), formally
enunciating the goal of attaining an internal market by December 31, 1992.
Additionally, the SEA significantly modified the legislative procedure used to
adopt internal market measures by an amendment, Article 100a, which enables
both easier and more democratic legislative action.A Although little noted at the
time, the SEA also added a new chapter, Cooperation in Economic and
Monetary Policy (Economic and Monetary Union), to the EEC Treaty. This
detailed discussion of the White Paper and the internal market program, see the author's Chapter 12
in Bermann et al., supra note 6, and the reference books cited in note 8, supra. Lord Cockfield has
written a fascinating narrative describing the background of the White Paper in Francis A. Cockfield,
The European Union: Creating the Single Market (1994).
2 Green Paper, supra note 3.
n An Intergovernmental Conference (IGQ is composed of authorized representatives from each
Member State, meeting to discuss possible amendments to the European Community Treaty, pursuant
to Article 236 (now deleted and replaced by Article 0 of the Treaty on European Union). An
Intergovernmental Conference functions through frequent, sometimes almost daily, meetings of
experts who do most of the preparatory work and initial drafting, together with regular (though more
occasional) meetings of representatives at the ministerial level who decide the more important issues
and agree upon the final text. Article 236 does not specify any voting mechanism in order to call an
IGC. Denmark and the United Kingdom opposed the calling of the Luxembourg IGC, but respected
the desire of the majority to hold it.
2 See supra note 7.
30 Article 100a enabled most internal market legislation to be adopted by the Council through the
use of qualified majority voting rather than by unanimous approval, and it required the use of the
parliamentary cooperation procedure, which obliges the Council to weigh very seriously any
amendments proposed by Parliament. Among the many useful articles analyzing the background,
scope and effect of the Single European Act are: Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, The Internal Market
Following the Single European Act, 24 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 361 (1987); and Hans-Joachim
Glaesner, The Single European Act Attempt at an Appraisal, 10 Fordham Int'l LJ. 446 (1987). At
the time, Ehlermann was Director-General of the Commission Legal Service and Glaesner was
Director-General of the Council Legal Service.
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consisted of a new Article 102(a),31 which called for further cooperation to meet
the objectives of Article 104, and which raised the possibility of further EEC
Treaty amendments to make institutional changes. Eventually, as the Community
progressed toward achievement of the internal market, proposals for an
Economic and Monetary Union moved to center stage.
At its June 1988 Hanover meeting, the European Council, incited particularly
by Chancellor Kohl of Germany and President Mitterand of France, referred to
Article 102(a) and "confirmed the objective of progressive realization of
economic and monetary union."'32 The European Council created a special
committee, chaired by Commission President Jacques Delors (who was formerly
French Finance Minister and an acknowledged monetary expert), to study and
propose "concrete stages" toward this goal. The committee consisted of all
Member State central bank governors and several economic and banking
specialists.33
The Delors Committee Report of April 17, 1989 provided a thorough review
of the essential character of an Economic and Monetary Union, together with a
pragmatic presentation of three proposed stages in its development.3' Although
the Delors Report was certainly influenced by the Werner Report, economic and
monetary conditions had changed radically since 1970, and the Delors Report
both reflected an awareness of the current realities and represented a far more
detailed and concrete approach to the creation of a monetary union. Due partly
to the practical nature of the committee's proposals, and partly to respect for the
high qualifications of the committee itself, this report not only formed the basis
for all subsequent discussions, but largely shaped the agenda of the 1990 Rome
Intergovernmental Conference.
The Delors Report defined the EMU's aim as the common management of
monetary and economic policies to attain common macroeconomic goals. It
identified three preconditions for the establishment of an EMU, namely, total
and irreversible convertibility of currencies; complete liberalization of capital
transactions and integration of the financial sector, and irreversible locking of
exchange rates. The report also endorsed the ultimate adoption of a single
European currency. The report proposed a treaty amendment to create a major
new institution, the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). Initially only an
advisory body, the ESCB would evolve through different stages of activities. Its
ultimate role would be to formulate and implement monetary policy for the
3' Article 102a was deleted by the Treaty on European Union. Its text can be found in the sources
cited in note 9, supra.
32 Bull. EC 6-1988, at 165.
33 The central bank governors served on the committee in their personal capacity, i.e., they did not
necessarily represent the views of their national governments, The experts serving on the committee
were Commissioner Andriessen, Baron Lamfalussy (General Manager of the Bank for International
Settlements in Basel), Miguel Boyer (President of Banco Exterior de Espana), and Niels Thygesen
(professor of economics in Copenhagen).
34 A summary of the Delors Report is contained in Bull, EC 4-1989, at 8. The Commission
published specially the entire report. Report on Economic and Monetary Union in the European
Community (Comm'n Off. of Off'l Pub. 1989). For a detailed analysis by a monetary expert, see
Jean-Victor Louis, A Monetary Union for Tomorrow?, 26 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 301 (1989).
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Community, participate in banking supervision on a Community level, and assist
Member States to attain price stability and curb budgetary deficits. The ESCB
would be composed of all the governors of national central banks, together with
a group of central administrators serving for fairly long terms. (The U.S. Federal
Reserve System and the German Bundesbank were obviously the models for
much of the ESCB structure.)
The Delors Committee Report further laid out three proposed stages toward
achieving the EMU. Each stage would require the attainment of certain results,
both at the Community and Member State levels. The final stage would give the
ESCB responsibility for monetary policy, lock exchange rates, and perhaps lead
to the creation of a common Community currency.
The Delors Report initiated a widespread and probing debate on the necessity
for, and the goals of an EMU, both at the Community level and in the private
sector, and the topic received great attention in the media. It quickly became the
most fascinating single idea for the further unification of the European
Community since the 1985 Commission White Paper on Completing the Internal
Market.35 Although most commentary on the Delors Report was favorable, John
Major, then Tory Chancellor of the Exchequer, issued on November 2, 1989 a
policy statement for the United Kingdom advocating national control over
monetary policy and criticizing any transfer of power to a centralized
bureaucracy, and specifically repudiating the idea of a single European currency.
Overcoming the objections of the U.K. government and the reluctance of other
Member States to abandon national control over monetary policy and the natural
attachment to their own currency clearly represented a difficult task for
Community leaders.
C. The Rome Intergovernmental Conference
At this point, the reaction of the European Council to the Delors Report
became critical. At its December 1989 meeting in Strasbourg, the European
Council approved the main themes of the Delors Report. 36 Moreover, after
intensive debate, the European Council voted 11 to 1, over the opposition of the
United Kingdom, to call an intergovernmental conference for the purpose of
planning an Economic and Monetary Union. The European Council specifically
urged the intergovernmental conference to respect the principle of subsidiarity in
formulating plans for an EMU, i.e., the Community's institutions should not be
given monetary functions or powers that can be better exercised by the Member
States. The European Council finally decided that the first stage set out in the
Delors Report should commence as of July 1, 1990, the date of entry into effect
of the 1988 directive on freedom of capital movements."
A March 1990 Commission study, "EMU: economic rationale and design of
the system," presented by Commissioner Christophersen, then responsible for
- White Paper, supra note 24.
3 Bull. EC 12-1989, at 11-12.
3 See infra Part IV for further discussion of this directive.
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monetary affairs, recommended that the European System of Central Banks (then
popularly known as the Eurofed) should "have a large degree of independence,"
but that it should nonetheless be "democratically accountable for its actions." 38
The study also emphasized that the ESCB should delegate most policy
implementation to the central banks, in accordance with the principle of
subsidiarity. The study further endorsed the idea that the ECU should become a
single currency for the Community, and not a thirteenth currency in use
alongside national currencies. This study served as the basis for a Commission
Communication on economic and monetary union, issued on August 21, 1990,
which essentially represented the Commission's proposals for the
Intergovernmental Conference agenda.39 Also of influence during this period
were the studies and proposals of the Committee of Central Bank Governors,
notably its draft statute for the ESCB.40
During the year preceding the Rome Intergovernmental Conference, the
Conservative government of the United Kingdom continued its strong opposition
to key features of the EMU. Prime Minister Thatcher opposed the idea of a
European central bank and preferred a weaker body which would only
coordinate monetary policy. The U.K. also rejected the concept of Community
macroeconomic policy making. Instead of a single European currency, John
Major, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, proposed that the ECU represent a
thirteenth or alternative currency.
The European Council meeting in Rome in October 1990 effectively set the
agenda for the intergovernmental conference.4' Over the opposition of the U.K.,
the European Council decided that there should be "a new monetary institution
comprising Member States' central banks, and a central organ, exercising full
responsibility for monetary policy." The European Council also decided that
there should be a single currency, that the new monetary institution should have
price stability as its primary objective, that national central banks should be
independent of national governments, and that the second stage leading to
monetary union should begin on January 1, 1994. Thus, a number of the key
features of the later monetary provisions of the TEU were settled in principle at
the outset of the intergovernmental negotiations.
The Rome Intergovernmental Conference 2 (IGC) began on December 15,
1990, at the conclusion of a European Council meeting that devoted principal
I European Commission, Working Paper on Economic and Monetary Union: Economic Rationale
and Design of the System, at 8 (March 1990), summarized in Bull. EC 3-1990, at 8-9.
19 European Commission, Communication on Economic and Monetary Union (August 21, 1990),
summarized in Bull. EC 7/8-1990, at 14-16 [hereinafter Commission, Communication on EMU]. The
main steps in the preparations for EMU, from the Delors Report to the Rome Intergovernmental
Conference, are described in Alexander Italianer, Mastering Maastricht EMU Issues and How They
Were Settled, in Economic and Monetary Union: Implications for National Policy-Makers 51, 61-64
(Klaus Gretschmann ed., 1993). Italianer is a Commission monetary specialist.
10 Submitted on Nov. 27, 1990, the draft statute for the ESCB was published in Europe, Doc. No.
1669/1670 (Dec. 8, 1990).
41 Bull. EC 10-1990, at 9.
42 For the nature of an Intergovernmental Conference, see note 28, supra. Although the U.K.
opposed the creation of EMU, it participated fully in the IGC negotiations on the topic.
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attention to the political issues that would be addressed by the IGC. The IGC
worked earnestly for a year, drafting the text of the Treaty on European Union.
For greater efficiency, the IGC worked in two distinct groups, one concentrating
on the issues surrounding EMU, and the second on the more political issues
involving the operations of the Community, the respective powers of the Council
and the Parliament, and the elaboration of the Common Foreign and Security
Policy and Coordination in Justice and Home Affairs.
To serve as a functional agenda for the discussions of the IGC group
dedicated to the issues of EMU, the Commission presented a draft treaty text on
December 10, 1990. 43 This can now be assessed as a bold, but successful
Commission initiative, showing again the leadership of President Delors and his
colleagues. The draft followed closely the Delors Report and the October Rome
European Council meeting conclusions, and it greatly influenced the final TEU
text that emerged from the IGC.
Following six months of careful review of the Commission draft, the
Luxembourg Presidency presented a new text in June 1991, with intensive final
debate during the Dutch Presidency in the fall." The Dutch, French, German and
U.K. representatives were particularly active in shaping the final text. Most of
the articles relating to the Economic and Monetary Union were prepared by
technical experts tending to follow the views of Germany and The Netherlands,
both states with powerful central banks and a tradition of strict monetary policy
and hard currencies. Reaching a consensus proved extremely difficult, due not
only to U.K. opposition, but also to hesitations on the part of other Member
States. Ultimately, several issues were left to the European Council meeting at
Maastricht in December 1991, which, after intensive debate, arrived at essential
compromises (notably, the right of Denmark and the United Kingdom to opt out
of participation in the final stage of EMU45). Thus the TEU provisions on
Economic and Monetary Union could finally be completed. Before discussion of
these TEU provisions in Part V, however, the important and related topic of free
movement of capital should be reviewed.
IV. FREE MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL AS A PRE-CONDITION FOR
MONETARY UNION
A. The Treaty of Rome and Early Developments
Free movement of capital is an essential condition for the attainment of an
Economic and Monetary Union. Significant restrictions on the movement of
capital, or upon payment for sales or services, would frustrate the achievement
43 The Commission's draft treaty text is described in Italianer, supra note 39, at 66-68.
" For an extremely detailed review of the drafting of all the key EMU provisions, comparing
their status in the various drafts, see Italianer, supra note 39, at 68-111. The text of the Luxembourg
Presidency draft (along with texts of other related documents and drafts) is reprinted in Richard
CorbeU, The Treaty of Maasticht-From Conception to Ratification. A Comprehensive Reference
Guide (1993). Since Luxembourg served as President of the Council and of the European Council
from January through June of 1990, it likewise acted as President of the IC.
4 See infra Part V.
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of an integrated monetary system and of an integrated market with a single
currency. Accordingly, the Delors Report stipulated that free movement of
capital was a requirement for the first stage of movement toward EMU.
The Treaty of Rome contained detailed provisions for attaining free movement
of capital, one of the "four freedoms" along with free movement of goods,
services and persons. The basic provision, Article 67, declared that "Member
States shall progressively abolish between themselves all restrictions on the
movement of capital."6 However, this declaration of principle was modified by
the language, "to the extent necessary to ensure the proper functioning of the
common market."
The Court of Justice relied upon this rather ambiguous proviso in concluding
that Article 67 did not have direct effect, and therefore required implementing
legislation to be adopted by the Council, pursuant to the legislative procedures
set out in EC Treaty Article 69. In 1981, in Criminal Proceedings against
Casatti,47 the Court accordingly rejected a challenge to Italian exchange controls
brought by a private party defendant based upon the alleged direct effect of
Article 67. The Court's judgment thus left in place national exchange controls
long after the end in 1969 of the transition period to achieve the common
market. The Court reached this conclusion, despite the fact that it had previously
held that Articles 9, 12, 30 and 34, achieving free movement of goods, Article
48 on free movement of workers, Article 52 on the right of establishment, and
Article 59 on the free provision of services, all had direct effect after the end of
the transition period in 19 6 9 .4 Presumably the Court was motivated in Casatti
by a view that the monetary sphere was particularly sensitive and that free
movement of capital could only safely be executed through careful review and
regulation by the Council.
The Court did, however, advance the cause of free movement of capital
significantly in Luisi & Carbone v. Ministero del Tesoro.49 In that judgment the
4 Article 67 of the EEC Treaty, together with the related Articles 68-73, were deleted by the
Treaty on European Union in 1993. For the original text, see the sources cited in note 9, supra.
' Case 203/80, 1981 E.C.R. 2595.
8 The doctrine of the direct effect of Treaty articles means that certain articles, whose terms are
deemed to be sufficiently precise, absolute and unconditional in conferring rights on individuals, can
be invoked by persons and enterprises in national court proceedings in order to set aside contrary
national legislation. The doctrine, developed by the Court in 1962, constitutes one of the most
powerful means of effectively achieving Community law. See, e.g., Van Gend en Loos v.
Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, Case 26/92, 1963 E.C.R. 1 (proclaiming the doctrine of
direct effect of Treaty articles for the first time, and holding that Article 12 has direct effect); Ianelli
& Volpi SpA v. Meroni, Case 74/76, 1977 E.C.R. 557 (Article 30 held to be "mandatory and
explicit" and therefore having direct effect); Pigs Marketing Board v. Redmond, Case 83/78, 1978
E.C.R. 2347 (Article 34 has direct effect); Van Duyn v. Home Office, Case 41/74, 1974 E.C.R. 1337
(Article 48 has direct effect); Reyners v. Belgium, Case 2/74, 1974 E.C.R. 631 (Article 52 has direct
effect, despite its textual reference to the need to abolish restrictions on the right during the
transition period); Van Binsbergen v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging, Case 33/74, 1974 E.C.R.
1299 (Article 59 has direct effect).
49 Cases 286/82 & 26/83, 1984 E.C.R. 377. With regard to services, the court concluded that free
movement of services applied to give rights of movement to persons who want to go to other States
to receive services just as it does to the providers of services who want to carry out trans-border
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Court held that Article 106, requiring the liberalization of national rules
restricting the trans-border transfer of payments to the extent that free movement
of services has been attained, had direct effect inasmuch as Article 59 on the
free provision of services also had direct effect. This conclusion caused the
removal of Italian and other Member States' exchange control restrictions on the
transborder transfer of funds to pay for services, e.g., in the fields of medical
treatment, education and tourism.
Two early measues, the First Capital Directive 921/60 of May 11, 196010 and
the Second Capital Directive 63/21 of December 18, 1962,51 did provide for
substantial liberalization, freeing most common commercial and private
movements of capital from exchange controls or other governmental
restrictions. 52 For example, the directives ended restrictions on personal capital
movements (through gifts, inheritance, or movements resulting from the change
of a person's residence), on the purchase or sale of real estate, on the purchase
or sale of securities, on the transfer of insurance premiums and payments, and
on short or medium term credit connected with commercial transactions.
However, most common banking or finance transactions were not liberalized by
the two directives.
This early progress was set back in the 1970s, when several Member States
sought to use exchange controls to protect their monetary policies and their
currencies during and after the world-wide energy recession. Articles 73, 108
and 109 of the EEC Treaty permitted emergency safeguard measures by the
Community, or in emergencies by Member States themselves, with the
acquiescence of the Commission. France and Italy made extensive use of such
exchange controls. Moreover, when Greece, Portugal and Spain joined the
Community in the 1980s, these states had a long tradition of exchange controls,
and the Treaties of Accession permitted them to keep such controls for long
transition periods.
It is noteworthy that when the Commission issued the famous White Paper on
Completing the Internal Market in June 1985, it did not include in its legislative
agenda any measure for achieving complete free movement of capital. When,
however, the internal market program met with enthusiastic endorsement, the
Commission proposed such a measure, and it was adopted with surprising ease
and rapidity. Presumably the Member States regarded the proposed directive on
free movement of capital as indispensable to an integrated financial market.
activities. The judgment is analyzed in Jean-Victor Louis, Free Movement of Tourists and Freedom
of Payments in the Community, 21 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 625 (1984), and Rene J.H. Smits, The
End of Claustrophobia: European Court Requires Free Travel Payments, 9 Eur. L. Rev. 192 (1984).
50 OJ. English Spec. Ed. 1960, at 49.
51 OJ. English Spec. Ed. 1963-64, at 5.
52 The directives' provisions are carefully analyzed by a Commission Legal Services specialist in
Peter Oliver, Free Movement of Capital Between Member States: Article 67(1) and Implementing
Directives, 9 Eur. L. Rev. 401 (1984). This review was supplemented, with special attention to the
Court's case law, in Peter Oliver & Jean-Pierre Bachd, Free Movement of Capital between the
Member States: Recent Developments, 26 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 61 (1989).
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B. The 1988 Directive and EC Treaty Article 73
Directive 88/361 to implement Article 6753 mandated the removal of all forms
of government restrictions on the movement of capital, and on all payments for
goods and services, no later than July 1, 1990 (although Ireland and Spain were
allowed to keep certain restrictions until 1992, and Greece and Portugal until
1995). The Directive was rapidly implemented by France and Italy54-a rather
dramatic development, since their exchange controls dated in some instances to
the 1940s. Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain also acted to abolish their
exchange control structures before the end of their periods of derogation, so that
free movement of capital under Directive 88/361 became fully effective in
1994.5
Even more important than the Directive was the Maastricht Treaty's insertion
of Article 73 into the EC Treaty, totally replacing Article 67 and the related
EEC Treaty provisions. The core coverage is now Article 73b:
1. Within the framework of the provisions set out in this Chapter, all restrictions on
the movement of capital between Member States and between Member States and
third countries shall be prohibited.
2. Within the framework of the provisions set out in this Chapter, all restrictions on
payments between Member States and between Member States and third countries
shall be prohibited.5 6
The language is absolute and unconditional. It is therefore not surprising that
the Court of Justice held that Article 73b has direct effect, enabling private
parties to invoke it to strike down incompatible Member State legislation or
regulations. This occurred in Criminal Proceedings against Sanz de Lera.5 In
that judgment, the Court also interpreted Article 73d, which permits Member
State "measures to prevent infringements of national law and regulations, in
particular in the field of taxation and the prudential supervision of financial
institutions." The Court concluded that Article 73d permitted Spain to require a
prior declaration to its responsible authorities before the export of large sums in
banknotes, in order to deter "tax evasion, money laundering, drug trafficking or
terrorism," but that Article 73d did not permit any system of prior or subsequent
authorizations or licenses for such movements of funds.58
Thus, Article 73, as interpreted by the Court in Sanz de Lera, requires the
complete free movement of capital since January 1, 1994. Member States may
only enforce limited systems of prior declarations for large capital movements,
in cash or otherwise, in order to try to prevent illicit activities, or "for purposes
s3 1988 OJ. (L 178) 5.
- France acted by Decree 89/154 of March 9, 1989, and Italy by a Decree of April 27, 1990.
5s For more detailed and relatively current coverage of free movement of capital, see Usher, supra
note 20, at 14-39. See also Weatherill & Beaumont, supra note 8, at 647-52.
-6 EC Treaty, art. 73b, as amended by the TEU.
57 Cases C-163/94, 165/95 and 250/94, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4821, noted by Fernando Castillo de la
Torre, 33 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 1065 (1996).
11 The Court had interpreted Article 4 of Directive 88/361, supia note 53, to the same effect in
Criminal Proceedings against Bordessa, Cases C-358/93 & C-418/93, 1995 E.C.R. 1-361.
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of administrative or statistical information, or [as] justified on grounds of public
policy or public security."'5 9 A vital pre-condition for monetary union was
accordingly achieved.
V. THE MAASTRICHT TREATY PROVISIONS ON ECONOMIC AND
MONETARY UNION
A. The Three Stages in Achieving Monetary Union
No aspect of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union is of greater practical
importance than the provisions on Economic and Monetary Union. Article B of
the TEU lists an economic and monetary union and a single currency as among
the principal objectives of European Union. A new Article 3a of the EC Treaty
declares that the Community should adopt a common economic policy, to be
attained "in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free
competition." 60 Article 3a(2) further requires:
the irrevocable fixing of exchange rates leading to the introduction of a single
currency, the ECU, and the definition and conduct of a single monetary policy and
exchange-rate policy the primary objective of both of which shall be to maintain
price stability and, without prejudice to this objective, to support the general
economic policies in the Community, in accordance with the principle of an open
market economy with free competition.6'
Thus, the guiding principles of an Economic and Monetary Union are given
Treaty (or constitutional) force. Note in particular the emphasis upon "price
stability," i.e., the maintenance of a low inflation rate (usually perceived to be
2% or less), as the "primary objective" of the Community's monetary policy.
Article 3a(3) notes other guiding principles: "stable prices, sound public
finances and monetary conditions and a sustainable balance of payments." 62
The TEU amendments to the EEC Treaty providing for aspects of the
economic and monetary union, together with the Protocols, are extremely
complicated. Only an overview is presented here, concentrating on the stages for
progressive creation of the EMU, and upon the key features of the proposed
institutional structure for the monetary union.6
59 EC Treaty, art. 73d.
60 For the text of Article 3a of the European Community Treaty, introduced by the TEU, see
sources cited in note 2, supra.
61 EC Treaty, art. 3a(2).
6 Professor Snyder of the European University Institute in Florence has aptly observed that this is
"the first time in the industrialized world [that] the objectives of economic policy thus are stated
explicitly in a constitution." Francis Snyder, EMU-Metaphor for European Union-Institutions,
Rules and Types of Regulation, in Europe after Maastricht: An Ever Closer Union?, at 63, 66
(Renaud Dehousse ed., 1994).
63 Probably the best single reference source for a detailed analysis of the EMU provisions of the
TEU is Smits, supra note 11. Smits, General Counsel of The Netherlands Central Bank, was actively
involved in the planning of EMU. Also valuable are: Economic and Monetary Union: Implications
for National Policy-Makers (Klaus Gretschmann ed., 1993) [hereinafter EMU: Implications]; and
European Monetary Integration (P. Welfens ed., 2d ed. 1994). EMU is usually covered rather briefly
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Although the EC Treaty goal is one of an Economic and Monetary Union, the
substantive EC Treaty provisions differ sharply in their delineation of the
economic as opposed to the monetary sphere. Article 3a(2) requires "the
definition and conduct of a single monetary policy," and subsequent articles
describing the modes of achieving this warrant the conclusion that the EC Treaty
intends to shape a true monetary union, a supranational structure." In contrast,
Article 3a(l) only states the goal of a Community "economic policy . .. based
on the close coordination of Member States' economic policies." This has much
more of an intergovernmental flavor-the Member States devise their own
economic policies, and their only Community obligation is one of coordination."
On the one hand, it is obvious that a monetary union cannot function well
without coordination of economic policies, because of the substantial spill-over
effect of governmental economic policy decisions upon monetary conditions. On
the other hand, centralized Community economic policy-making would require
an enormous cession of national sovereignty, because of the close link between
economic policy and fiscal policy, tax collection, social security and social
welfare systems, and so on. It may be that a successful EMU will lead to greater
Community harmonization of Member State tax and social security systems, but
for the present the EC Treaty only requires coordination of national economic
policies.
In the substantive EC Treaty provisions, a new Article 103 requires Member
States to "regard their economic policies as a matter of common concern" and
to coordinate them in accordance with guidelines established by the Council,
acting by qualified majority. Because this is a highly sensitive area, the Council
must first submit its draft guidelines to the European Council for its"conclusion" on them. This is one of the instances in which the TEU recognizes
a specific role for the European Council, but still one within the overall Article
B mandate that the European Court should give policy guidelines-the Council
still takes the final legal act."6 The Parliament is to be kept informed, but does
in the leading general surveys of the European Community. See, e.g., Weatherill & Beaumont, supra
note 8, at 652-60.
The late J6m Pipkorn, formerly the Commission Legal Service's monetary expert, wrote perhaps
the best single article on the TEU provisions on EMU. See J6rn Pipkorn, Legal Arrangements in the
Treaty of Maastricht for the Effectiveness of the Economic and Monetary Union, 31 Common Mkt.
L. Rev. 263 (1994). Other valuable studies concentrating on the institutional aspects of EMU are:
Laurence Gormley & Jakob De Haan, The Democratic Deficit of the European Central Bank, 21 Eur.
L. Rev. 95 (1996); Piet-Jan Slot, The Institutional Provisions of the EMU, in Institutional Dynamics
of European Integration Il at 229 (Deirdre Curtin & Ton Henkels eds., 1995); and Snyder, supra note
62. It is also helpful to consult Italianer, supra note 39, on the drafting development of the
institutional provisions for EMU in the TEU.
64 Snyder, supra note 62, at 66 & 69.
61 For Professor Snyder, a single monetary policy, "even if subject to checks and balances,
demands uniformity," while coordination of economic policies "tolerates diversity." Id. at 66. In
contrast, Smits lays stress on Article 3a's goal of "an economic policy" (in the singular) and
contends that the coordination of Member State policies should "result in a single economic policy"
for the Community. Stnits, supra note 11, at 66.
6The background for this approach is discussed in Italianer, supra note 39, at 95-96.
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not participate in shaping the guidelines. 67 I will discuss further the recent
execution of this economic coordination in Parts VII and VII.
The Maastricht Treaty follows the three stage structure proposed in the 1989
Delors Report for the gradual creation of EMU. In accordance with this scheme,
on June 1, 1990, the Community began the first stage of progress toward the
EMU. The first stage had three components: (1) free movement of capital,
already achieved by the 1988 directive described previously in Part IV.B; (2)
adherence (at least in principle) of all Member States to the European Monetary
System and to its Exchange Rate Mechanism; (3) an increased level of monetary
coordination, both by governmental action and through coordination among the
central banks." Somewhat curiously, the TEU never specifically mentions the
first stage, but takes it for granted.
The Treaty fixes January 1, 1994 as the date for passage to the second stage
(Article 109e). The second stage, from 1994 to the end of 1998, has two
essential features: the creation of the European Monetary Institute (EMI), and
the commencement of an obligation on the part of Member States to strive to
meet certain key economic and monetary conditions for EMU, the so-called
convergence criteria.69 These conditions which Member States must try to fulfill
during the second stage are critical to further progress, but have proved quite
difficult to attain for many States.7°
The European Monetary Institute (EMI) is described in Article 109e, and the
EMI's Statute is laid down in a Protocol.7' The EMI is composed of a President,
named by common accord of the Member States, together with the governors of
the Member State central banks. The EMI's purpose is to coordinate policy and
action by the central banks, monitor the European Monetary System, and prepare
the instruments and procedures for the single monetary policy of the third stage.
The Committee of Governors of Central Banks, created in 1964, has now been
replaced by the EMI.72 Although it was initially proposed during the Rome IGC
that the EMI begin assuming some central bank governance powers, the final
TEU text gave the EMI no central bank functions. 73 The EMI is essentially
67 Parliament's minor role is an example of the "democratic deficit," to be discussed further in
Part VI.C, infra.
" For a general discussion of the first stage, see Smits, supra note 11, at 41-45. For a description
of the operations of the Monetary Committee and the Committee of Governors of Central Banks,
which carried out the principal task of monetary coordination during the first stage, see Snyder,
supra note 62, at 71-73.
69 Smits describes the second stage in detail. Smits, supra note 11, at 45-52.
" For the purpose of a more coherent presentation, the description of the "convergence criteria"
and the current state of progress within the Community in the effort to achieve them is provided in
Part VM infra.
7' For a more detailed description of the composition, role and function of the EMI, see Pipkorn,
supra note 63, at 282-84; Smits, supra note 11, at 49-51; and Snyder, supra note 62, at 74-76.
- EC Ikeaty, art 109f().
" See Italianer, supra note 39, at 93-94. Smits remarks that in this stage, monetary policy remains
a Member State central bank's responsibility; until the third stage, there is to be no "monetary policy
of the Union." Smits, supra note 11, at 50.
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intended to be an intermediary body, paving the way for the European System
of Central Banks (ESCB), described below.74
Economic and Monetary Union is to be fully achieved in the third and final
stage, which consists of: (1) the creation of the European Central Bank and the
European System of Central Banks, whose role is to exercise the principal
monetary powers of the EMU; (2) a binding system of regulation for the
monetary policies of the Member States participating in the final stage of EMU;
and (3) the creation of a single currency for the participating Member States,
ultimately in the form of banknotes and coins which will serve as the sole legal
tender.75
A qualified majority decision of the Council will determine which Member
States have satisfied the convergence criteria and will participate in the third
stage. 76 However, the importance of the decision is such that the Council shall
meet in an extraordinary session of the Heads of State or Government, which
makes this virtually a European Council decision. The TEU presumably did not
formally make this action one to be taken by the European Council, because to
date that body has never been given any legislative or legally-binding decision-
making function, and because the European Council usually reaches its policy
decisions by consensus, while it was desired to use only a qualified majority
vote to select those Member States which qualify for entry into the final stage of
EMU." Indeed, it was the December 1991 Maastricht European Council itself
which dictated the unusual composition of the Council for purposes of Article
109j in order, as Italianer notes, that the decision be taken formally "at the
highest political level and within the Community legal framework."7 s The
Council will act on the basis of reports produced by the Commission and the
EMI, together with specific recommendations from the Commission, and the
Parliament must provide an opinion."
Article 109j(3) foresaw that the Council might act to commence the third
stage by a decision taken before December 31, 1996 if a majority of Member
States met the necessary criteria, but this in fact did not occur.80 Article 109j(4)
prescribed a fall-back position: in all events, the third stage is to begin on
January 1, 1999 for those Member States which fulfill the prescribed economic
and monetary conditions, even if they do not represent a majority of the
74 France, Italy and the Commission' urged during the IGC that the European Central Bank be
created at the start of stage two, while Germany opposed this suggestion. The idea of an EMI came
in a compromise proposed by Belgium. See Pipkom, supra note 63, at 283. Italianer gives further
details on the drafting of the EMI provisions. Italianer, supra note 39, at 91.
11 The second and third aspects of EMU will be further discussed in Parts vm and IX
respectively.
76 EC Treaty, art. 109j.
7 Italianer, supra note 39, at 100.
Id. at 100; see also id. at 97-100. For a general review of the Article 109j procedure, see Smits,
supra note 11, at 116-20.
9EC Treaty, art. 109j(1)-(4).
90 The December 1996 Dublin European Council formally decided that it was not possible to
commence EMU at that time. See infra note 264 and accompanying text.
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Community States."' In effect, this means that the "two-tier" or "two-speed"
Europe approach of the EMS will definitely persist in the EMU-some Member
States will participate from the outset, while others will join later (or,
conceivably, will never join).
However, the fact that some Member States will not be able to qualify to join
the final stage of EMU (or may choose not to do so) will have much more
serious implications than the non-participation of certain states in EMS ever did.
As Professor Slot has observed, the economies of the non-participating Member
States may develop quite differently from those within the monetary discipline
of EMU,8 2 and the "multi-tier system may also jeopardize the unity and the
functioning of the internal market and the homogeneity of Community Law." 3
Fortunately, as we shall see in Part VII, it is currently likely that eleven Member
States will be able to qualify for entry into the third stage of EMU, and the
others are also expected ultimately to join in that stage.
Due to the implacable opposition of the U.K. government, then led by Prime
Minister Major, to any absolute obligation on Member States to join in the final
stage of EMU,84 the European Council meeting at Maastricht in December 1991
agreed upon a special Protocol for the U.K.85 By its terms, the U.K. has an
option to remain outside of the third stage of monetary union even if it meets
the economic and monetary conditions set to join it. Denmark then demanded
and received a similar Protocol.s6 As a consequence, both Denmark and the U.K.
have the right not to participate in the monetary union, i.e., not to be represented
in the European System of Central Banks nor to be governed by its rules, and
not to replace their currency with the single currency, the euro.87 These protocols
represent perhaps the most important compromise struck by the European
Council meeting at Maastricht, certainly crucial in enabling EMU to go forward.
SI Pipkorn observes that the December 1991 Maastricht European Council added Article 109j(4) in
order to "underline the irreversible character of the move towards EMU." Pipkorn, supra note 63, at
289. However, he contends that Article 109j(4) does not have any direct effect, i.e., does not mean
that certain qualifying States will automatically enter EMU on January 1, 1999, but rather that the
Council must decide whether enough States qualify to make EMU "workable and credible." Id. at
290. Smits calls the transition to the third stage on January 1, 1999 "semi-automatic," but also
believes that the Council could postpone that date if not enough States qualified to form "a
manageable group." Smits, supra note 11, at 120.
82 Slot, supra note 63, at 244.
93 Id. at 245.
8 The U.K.'s initial position was that no state should enter EMU until after its government should
have ratified the decision to enter in accordance with its national constitutional requirements. When
this view was rejected by the IGC, the U.K. demanded that it should have the political option
whether or not to join the final stage. See Pipkorn, supra note 63, at 287.
8 TEU, Protocol on Certain Provisions Relating to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland.
96 TEU, Protocol on Certain Provisions Relating to Denmark (also expressly contains a reference
to Denmark's power to abrogate any initial decision to opt out of the third stage). For a description,
see Smits, supra note 11, at 137-38.
87 The U.K. Protocol is more detailed than that for Denmark, e.g., in ruling out any obligation to
avoid excessive government deficits. See Italianer, supra note 39, at 97-98; Smits, supra note 11, at
138-39.
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On their side, Denmark and the United Kingdom stipulated in another Protocolss
that they would not "prevent the entering into the third stage," an important
point because the two states will be represented in the Council meeting held for
this purpose under Article 109j(4). At the time of the Edinburgh European
Council meeting in December 1992, the other Member States recognized
Denmark's exercise of its option not to join in the third stage,89 a decision that
was apparently quite critical in obtaining the requisite majority in the second
Danish referendum that finally ratified the TEU in June 1993. The U.K., initially
under the government of Prime Minister Major, and since May 1997 under that
of Prime Minister Blair, has carefully kept open its option whether or not to join
in the third stage sometime after 1999.
Those Member States which are unable to meet the convergence criteria in
1998 and join EMU in 1999 are not, of course, irrevocably shut out. The Rome
IGC decided early on that there should be a periodic reexamination of the
qualifications of the non-participating Member States (or " Member States with
a derogation," to use the TEU term). The final text of Article 109k stipulates
that every two years (hence, initially in the spring of 2000) the Council in its
composition of Heads of State or Government will examine the degree to which
"States with a derogation" satisfy the convergence criteria. Furthermore, upon
demand by any Member State, the Council will examine its qualifications on an
ad hoc basis.90 Naturally, the governors of the central banks of "States with a
derogation" will not be members of the Governing Council of the ECB, nor will
those states participate in the election of the Executive Board of the ECB or
vote on certain other Council decisions appropriate only for those states
participating in the third stage of EMU. 91
B. The European Central Bank and the European System of Central Banks
When the third stage begins, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the
European System of Central Banks (ESCB), described in Article 106 and a
Protocol,92 will replace the European Monetary Institute, which will then be
liquidated.93 The ESCB will be composed of a European Central Bank (ECB)
and the national central banks. The ECB in turn will have an Executive Board
98 TEU. Protocol on the Transition to the Third Stage of Economic and Monetary Union.
89 European Council Decision on Certain Problems Raised by Denmark in the Treaty on European
Union, 1992 OJ. (C 348) 1 [hereinafter European Council Decision, Problems Raised by Denmark].
90 See Smits, supra note 11, at 136-37.
91 EC Treaty, art. 109k(3)-(5).
9 The complex TEU provisions on the structure and role of the ECB and the ESCB are ably
surveyed in Smits, supra note 11, at 92-115. See also Slot, supra note 63, at 231-36. Italianer
informs us that on November 27, 1990, the Committee of Governors of Central Banks presented the
Rome IGC with a draft Statute of the ESCB which provided important input. Italianer, supra note
39, at 65. Most of the TEU text on this topic was already settled by the time of the Luxembourg
Presidency draft in June 1991. Id. at 79-80.
91 The modalities of liquidation of the EM] are set out in TEU, Protocol on the Statute of the
EM], art. 23. "All assets and liabilities of the EM] shall then pass automatically to the ECB," and
the President of the EMI "shall relinquish his office." Id.
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composed of the President, a Vice-President, and four members, all named for
eight-year terms by common accord of the Member States participating in the
third stage, without any possibility of reappointment. 94 Parliament is only
consulted in the process of the Executive Board selection.95 The ECB's
Governing Council, composed of the Executive Board and the Governors of the
participating Member State central banks, will be the usual decision-making
body, although some issues of lesser importance may be dealt with by the
Executive Board alone.96 In operational terms, the decisions of the Governing
Council will normally be carried out by the national central banks. This structure
is accordingly analogous to that of the U.S. Federal Reserve Board and the
Bundesbank. 7
EC Treaty Article 107 states the important principle that the ECB, the ESCB,
and Member State central banks shall have total independence in their decision
making. 9 They are categorically forbidden to take instructions either from
Community institutions or from Member States. This provision represents a
major policy decision, because most central banks were not independent of their
governments," and because some Member States were reluctant to allow the
ECB and ESCB to enjoy total independence from the Council. The principle of
94 EC Treaty, art. 109a. EC Treaty, art. 1091(1) specifies that the designation of the initial
Executive Board be made by common accord of the participating States only, and that they may
decide to limit its initial membership to four or five, rather than six.
93 TEU, Protocol on the Statutes of the ESCB and the ECB, art. 50 stipulates this, as well as
requiring the consultation of the EMI Council. Smits speculates that Parliament may review the
qualifications of proposed Executive Board members in a process analogous to "confimation
hearings" in the U.S. Senate on proposed Federal Reserve Board members. Smits, supra note 11, at
96-97. He also finds it "peculiar that no place was found for the Commission in the nomination
process." Id. at 96.
96 Professor Slot of Leyden well observes, however, that the "daily business" managed by the
Executive Board, is "often of decisive importance in monetary policy." Slot, supra note 63, at 235.
97 The Bundesbank was certainly the basic model. Its Central Bank Council (Zentralbankrat)
consists of a Directorate (Direktorium) of a President, Vice-President and six other members named
by the German Federal Government, serving together with the nine presidents of the State Central
Banks (Landeszentralbanken). See Gormley & de Haan, supra note 63, at 99;, Smits, supra note 11,
at 159. The Bundesbank in turn is substantially modeled on the U.S. Federal Reserve Board. For a
description of the structure and role of the Federal Reserve System, see Michael P. Malloy, 1
Banking Law and Regulation § 1.3.2 (1997).
98 The important topic of the independence of the ECB and the national central banks is discussed
in detail both with regard to the personal independence of their members and the functional
independence of the entities in Smits, supra note 11, at 152-68.
9 In Europe, the German Bundesbank has traditionally enjoyed the greatest degree of
independence, a principle guaranteed by article 12 of its 1957 basic statute: "In exercising the
powers conferred on it by this Act, it shall be independent of instructions from the government."
Gormley & de Haan, supra note 63, at 97-98. Although The Netherlands Central Bank by custom
enjoys substantial independence, there is no statutory basis for this, and the Minister of Finance has
the power to issue monetary policy instructions to the Central Bank. Id. at 98. In contrast, in France,
the U.K. and the other Member States, the central banks traditionally have been subject to directions
of the Minister of Finance. See Slot, supra note 63, at 231. Smits observes that "there is no tradition
of central bank independence in the majority of Members States." Smits, supra note 11, at 159. He
also notes that France initially wanted the ESCB to take guidelines from the European Council. Id.
at 160 n.52; accord, Italianer, supra note 39, at 69.
1998]
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN LAW
independence was strongly advocated by Germany, whose Bundesbank enjoys
such independence from its government, as critical in order to ensure that the
ECB and ESCB would have the freedom to follow strict, and hence often
unpopular, monetary policies.
As noted previously in Part I, the Delors Report and the Commission's
Christopherson Report both urged that the ECB (then called the Eurofed) be
independent, and the October 1990 Rome European Council meeting included
the principle of independence in its agenda for the IGC. The principle was early
accepted by the Intergovernmental Conference, figured in the Luxembourg
Presidency draft text, and was virtually unchanged in the final TEU.' °°
Presumably a consensus was quickly reached on the principle of independence
for the ECB, as Professor Slot has observed, "mainly because of the superior
track-record of the Bundesbank and the Dutch Central Bank in maintaining price
stability."' 0'
Accessory to the principle of independence of the ECB is that of the
independence of the national central banks and their members, since, as noted
before, the national central banks represent the usual operational arm of the
ESCB. Article 109e(5) requires Member States to take action to ensure the
independence of their central banks during the second stage. In addition, Article
108 stipulates that Member States must put their national regulations concerning
central banks into full compliance with the EC Treaty before the creation of the
European Central Bank, which implicitly makes national central bank
independence a pre-condition for a state's participation in the third stage of
EMU. France and Spain rapidly acted to guarantee the independence of their
central banks. 10 2 In a surprise post-election move, the new U.K. Labor
government of Prime Minister Blair declared the independence of the Bank of
England in May 1997 .103 On the other hand, Sweden has refrained from making
its central bank independent, a point of importance with regard to its eligibility
for the third stage.
The role and powers of the European System of Central Banks are set out in
Article 105. Thus, Article 105(1) declares:
The primary objective of the ESCB shall be to maintain price stability. Without
prejudice to the objective of price stability, the ESCB shall support the general
economic policies in the Community with a view to contributing to the achievement
of the objectives of the Community as laid down in Article 2. The ESCB shall act in
accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free competition,
,00 Italianer, supra note 39, at 80.
101 Slot, supra note 63, at 231. Accord, Gormley & de Haan, supra note 63, at 95; Pipkom, supra
note 63, at 281. I will discuss later, at infra Part VI.B, whether the Treaty's articulation of the
principle of independence is so absolute in terms that it might be considered to breach the normally
overriding principle of democratic accountability.
102 Commission, General Report 1994, supra note 22, at point 37.
m0 Youssef M. Ibrahim, Britain's New Tack: Labor Initiative. Britain's Shifting Monetary Policy to
Central Bank, N.Y. Times, May 7, 1997, at Al (describing the development as "a historic change in
economic policy").
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favouring an efficient allocation of resources, and in compliance with the principles
set out in Article 3a.104
Article 105 gives Treaty (or constitutional) force to the concept that the
ESCB's "primary objective" is "price stability."' 1 5 Article 105(1) thus expressly
mandates the ESCB to achieve the TEU goals stated in Article 3a. The language
is modeled upon the role assigned to the Bundesbank in its 1957 basic statute.106
The Delors Report enunciated the basic approach of this text, and the October
1990 Rome European Council stipulated that the primary objective of the central
monetary institution should be "price stability."' 1 7 The term has never been
formally defined, but seems to be universally accepted as an inflation rate
ranging from zero up to a maximum of 2 %.I0 The emphasis on "price stability"
testifies to the influence of Germany in the drafting stage, because most other
States either had no express principal policy goal for their central banks, or had
a more general economic welfare goal (e.g., The Netherlands)."09
Note that Article 105(1) stipulates that the ESCB shall support the "general
economic policies of the Community," but "without prejudice" to its primary
goal of price stability, and shall also operate in accordance with "the principle
of an open market economy with free competition" and the other secondary
goals cited in Article 3a. This text is again modeled upon that governing the
Bundesbank,"" and will certainly significantly impact the manner in which the
ESCB shapes future monetary policy."'
Article 105(2) sets out the "basic tasks" of the ESCB, namely "to define and
implement the monetary policy of the Community," to conduct foreign exchange
operations, to hold the Member States' official foreign reserves (initially to be
set at 50 billion ECU), and to promote the smooth operation of the Community
payment systems." 2 The most important point to note here is that this article
effectively transfers most monetary power from the Member States to the ESCB
(and not to the other Community institutions). Since, as will be seen in Part
104 EC Treaty, art. 105(1). Italianer informs us that this text came in late in the Rome IGC, but
only made express what had been previously accepted. Italianer, supra note 39, at 78.
105 Snyder correctly observes that this "statement of the aim of price stability as a constitutional
principle represents a more unambiguous ranking of the aims of monetary policy than is found even
in Germany." Snyder, supra note 62, at 68. I will discuss this further in Part VIE, infra.
10 Gormley & de Haan, supra note 63, at 97; Pipkorn, supra note 63, at 281.
107 Bull. EC 10-1990, at 9.
108 Italianer cites the Dutch Central Bank President Duisenherg as giving this pragmatic definition
in a 1992 speech. Italianer, supra note 39, at 79. The European Monetary Institute also set 2% as the
maximum ceiling for inflation that still represented price stability in European Monetary Institute,
1994 Annual Report 50, cited in Smits, supra note 11, at 185 n.158.
109 Gormley and de Haan, both professors at Groningen, translate the statutory objective of The
Netherlands Central Bank as: "to regulate the value of the Dutch currency in such a manner as is
most useful for the welfare of the country." Gormley & de Haan, supra note 63, at 97 n.14.
110 Pipkorn quotes Article 12 of the German Bundesbank law to this effect. Pipkom, supra note
63, at 281.
"I For an analytic discussion of the implications of the text, see Smits, supra note 11, at 187-92.
112 The ESCB's operational role in regulating monetary policy is of capital importance, but it is
too technical to cover here. For a detailed and analytic description, see Smits, supra note 11, at 176-
202, 223-306.
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VIII, the States participating in the third stage must follow monetary guidelines
in their national policies, this represents a genuine and significant transfer of
power-and implicitly of sovereignty.
During the Rome Intergovernmental Conference, there was considerable
debate concerning the extent of the role the ESCB might play in prudential
supervision of banks and other financial institutions. Although in some Member
States the central bank has certain powers of prudential supervision, in most
(rather like the American model) prudential supervision is entirely or largely
carried out by the Ministry of Finance, aided by other regulatory authorities."13
Some Member States felt that the Ministry of Finance, or specialized authorities,
were better able to carry out prudential supervision of financial institutions and
that the ESCB might have a conflict of interest between achieving its goals of
price stability and general monetary stability, on the one hand, and properly
carrying out such prudential supervision of financial institutions on the other." 4
A compromise was struck: Article 105(5) calls on the ESCB to "contribute to
the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the competent authorities relating to
the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the financial
system." This would suggest merely a role of advice, coordination and
cooperation for the ESCB.
However, Article 105(6) authorizes the Council to "confer upon the ECB
specific tasks" ' s in the prudential supervision of financial institutions (but the
text specifically excludes supervision of insurance companies)." 6 Such
legislation may prove difficult to adopt: the Council must act unanimously, and
the Parliament must give its assent. 17 It may be expected that serious proposals
for any specific role for the ESCB in the prudential supervision of financial
institutions will not be raised until the ESCB has been operational for some
time, perhaps years.
The creation and control of the single Community currency, now scheduled to
be called the euro" 8 (and not the ECU, although that term is used for the single
113 Smits, supra note 11, at 319-22.
"4 Id. at 323-27. Professor Ian Harden contends that prudential supervision of financial institutions
is better undertaken by a separate regulatory institution, as is the case in France and Germany, and
therefore approves the final TEU approach. Ian Harden, The European Central Bank and the Role of
National Central Banks in Economic and Monetary Union, in EMU: Implications, supra note 63, at
149, 159-61.
"1 Italianer notes that the Luxembourg Presidency draft text in June 1991 had expressly given the
ESCB powers "in the definition, coordination and execution of policies relating to prudential control
and stability of the financial system," so that the final TEU text represents a considerable draw-back
on this subject. Italianer, supra note 39, at 87. Smits observes that two major Member States
opposed an ECB role in prudential supervision, and that the compromise final text is "relatively
meagre." Smits, supra note 11, at 336.
116 Italianer notes that the text implicitly excludes any role for the ESCB in the regulation of
financial markets as opposed to financial institutions. Id.
117 Incidentally, this provision constitutes the sole example of significant legislative power given
to the Parliament in connection with EMU.
i The December 1995 Madrid European Council confirmed the designation of the single
currency as the "euro." Bull. EU 12-1995, at 10. See the discussion of the Madrid European
Council meeting in Part VI.A, infra.
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currency in Articles 3a and 109 of the Maastricht Treaty), is placed in the ECB
by Article 105a. Former Bundesbank President Karl Otto Pohl has declared that"every efficient central bank must have... the monopoly of money creation,"
and that the ESCB would be a "tiger without teeth" if it lacked this power." 9
With regard to the bank notes, which will be the only "legal tender" in the
participating third stage Member States, the ECB's power of emission and
control is exclusive. Article 105a expressly provides the ECB with the power to
determine the denomination and features of banknotes, but, to enable speed in
producing the banknotes, the European Monetary Institute has already taken the
initial decisions. n°
Member States will continue to have the power to issue coins, but the ECB
can control the total volume of any issue.' 2' The power to determine the
denominations and specifications of coins is given to the Council by Article
105a(2), but the Council must act in accordance with the parliamentary
cooperation procedure.in
The European Central Bank has been granted an unusual degree of regulatory
power.123 Pursuant to Article 108a(1), the ECB may issue regulations to
implement its monetary policy for the Community (or, more precisely, for the
Member States participating in the third stage of monetary union, until all have
joined in this stage), to govern the minimum reserves which it requires banking
institutions to keep on deposit with the ECB and national central banks, to
regulate bank clearing and payment systems, and to carry out prudential
supervision of financial institutions (to the extent authorized by the Council, as
noted above). The ECB may also take binding decisions or issue
recommendations or opinions. Further, under a rather extraordinary provision,
I9 Karl Otto Pohl, Basic Features of a European Monetary Order, in European Monetary
Integration, supra note 63, at 79, 85. For a more detailed analysis of Article 105a, see Smits, supra
note 11, at 203-10.
'2 These preparations for the single currency will be discussed further in Part IX.A, infra.
121 Italianer informs us that the Luxembourg Presidency draft treaty would have given the ESCB
the power to regulate the issue of banknotes and coins. Italianer, supra note 39, at 86-87. In contrast,
the final TEU text mandates that the ECB alone can authorize banknotes, while the States continue
to issue coins, subject however to ECB approval of the total volume of coins issued, since this has
an impact on total money supply.
12 It is interesting to note that the European Council's mandate that the Turin Intergovernmental
Conference should not discuss any change in the Maastricht Treaty's EMU articles resulted in the
survival of the parliamentary cooperation procedure in this provision, although the Treaty of
Amsterdam will replace elsewhere in the Treaty all references to the cooperation procedure by the
co-decision procedure. Pursuant to Article N of the TEU, the Turin Intergovernmental Conference
was convened by the Member States in April 1996 to propose amendments to the TEU. This new set
of amendments, which received political approval from the June 1997 Amsterdam European Council,
was signed at Amsterdam on October 2, 1997 and is called the Treaty of Amsterdam. It is presently
in the process of ratification. Its complete text, and the text of the European Community Treaty
consolidated with the new amendments, is published in 1997 OJ. (C 340) 1. The cooperation
procedure was replaced by the codecision procedure in Articles 75 (transport), 127 (vocational
training), 130o (research and development), 130s (environment), and a number of other provisions.
1' Professor Slot observes: "Compared to the situation (of central banks] in Member States, the
power to issue regulations is remarkable and once more underscores the independent position of the
ECB." Slot, supra note 63, at 235.
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Article 108a(3), the ECB may impose sanctions-"fmes or periodic penalty
payments on undertakings for failure to comply with its regulations or
decisions.' ' 2 4
In view of the scope of the European Central Bank's role and tasks, and the
dimension of its regulatory powers, it is important that the EC Treaty clearly
delineates the principle of judicial review. Article 173 was amended to grant the
Court of Justice jurisdiction over actions brought by Member States, the
Council, the Commission or private parties against the ECB to review the
legality of its acts, and for actions brought by the ECB against the Community
political institutions in order to protect its "prerogatives." ' 25 Similarly, the ECB
will have the power to sue the Council, Commission and the Parliament under
Article 175 for their failure to fulfill a duty to act in areas "falling within [the
ECB's] field of competence," and the ECB can itself be sued for a failure to act
to fulfill its duties by those institutions, Member States, or private parties.
Article 177 was amended to include the acts of the ECB among those which
may be the subject of questions referred to the Court of Justice by national
courts. Finally, the Court of Justice was given the power, under Article 180(d),
to review the compliance of national central banks with their obligations in the
ESCB, and to compel their compliance if necessary.126
Decision-making in the ESCB and the ECB is governed by a Treaty Protocol
on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European
Central Bank. 27 For the Governing Council, Article 10 of the Protocol
prescribes a quorum of two-thirds, dictates that the Governing Council can
usually take binding acts by simple majority, and grants the President a tie-
breaking vote.'2 Proxies are not permitted, although action by teleconferencing
12 Note that unlike the limits placed by articles 15-17 of Regulation 17/62, OJ. English Spec. Ed.
1959-62, at 87, on the Commission power to impose sanctions on enterprises for their violation of
Community competition rules, Article 108a(3) contains no reference to limits on sanctions imposed
by the ECB. However, the Court of Justice's power of judicial review of such ECB sanction
decisions under Article 173 would enable limits to be set on sanctions. The Court presumably would
give considerable deference to ECB decisions, but could reduce or totally eliminate ECB sanctions
when it deems them to be excessive, or insufficiently founded on factual findings, as it occasionally
has done with Commission fines in competition proceedings. See, e.g., S.A. Musique Diffusion
Frangaise v. Commission (Pioneer), Case 100-103/80, 1983 E.C.R. 1825.
25 The ECB's limited standing under Article 173 only to protect its "prerogatives" is parallel to
the standing given to the European Parliament under that Article. This limitation is based upon the
Court's judgment in Parliament v. Council (Post-Chernobyl), Case C-70/88, 1990 E.C.R. 1-2041. For
example, the ECB could sue the Council under Article 173 if the Council were to legislate to permit
a Member State central bank to issue banknotes as legal tender, because that would violate the
ECB's prerogative to issue banknotes. The ECB could not, however, sue the Council because the
ECB considers the Council to have made a substantive or procedural error in adopting legislation
with implications for monetary policy, e.g., in the prudential supervision of banks, because that
would not involve an ECB prerogative. See in this regard the Court's judgment on the merits in
Post-Chernobyl, Case C-70/88, 1991 E.C.R. 1-4529, 4567.
'2 The importance of judicial review with regard to the ECB is discussed further in Part VI.D,
infra.
327 The Protocol is attached to the TEU. See also note 95, supra.
'2 For more detailed coverage of voting in the Governing Council and the Executive Board, see
Smits, supra note 11, at 99-102.
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is. A type of qualified majority voting, with the weight of votes set in accord
with national central bank shares in subscribed ECB capital, is mandated for
important decisions on the ECB's capital structure, control of foreign reserves,
and accounts.
Article 11 of the Protocol prescribes that the six Executive Board members
must serve full time, be "persons of recognized standing and professional
experience in monetary or banking matters," and sets voting rules for the
Executive Board parallel to those for the Governing Council. Under Protocol
Article 13, the President of the ECB chairs both the Governing Council and the
Executive Board, and represents the ECB in external matters. The force of the
personality of the initial ECB President, and custom as the institution
commences its operations, will partially determine the ultimate power and
prestige of the post, but it may safely be predicted that the office of President of
the ECB will certainly be as important as that of any Commission member, and
may become second in status only to that of the Commission President.
Presumably for purposes of coordination, EC Treaty Article 109b(1) grants the
President of the Council and a member of the Commission the right to
participate, without vote, in meetings of the Governing Council. The President of
the Council may even "submit a motion for deliberation" to the Governing
Council.' 9 Correlatively, the President of the ECB may participate in Council
meetings (on a non-voting basis) when "matters relating to the objectives and
tasks of the ESCB" are discussed.130
As the prior review suggests, the European Parliament has been given only a
modest role in the developmental stages of EMU, and in the institutional
structures after it becomes operational.' 3' Parliament need only be consulted in
the Council's crucial decision on which Member States qualify for entry into the
third stage, 32 and in the designation of the members of the ECB's Executive
Board.S33 Parliament's most substantial power is negative, its right of assent (or
veto) 134 with regard to Council decisions to accord the ESCB prudential
supervisory authority over financial institutions, 35 and with regard to Council
129 The right of the President of the Council and a Commission member to participate in ECB
meetings, and of the Council President to submit a motion, is presumably modeled on the status of
the Bundesbank, whose basic law permits government ministers- to attend Bundesbank meetings.
Gormley & de Haan, supra note 63, at 98. Smits contends that the Council President's motion must
only be "for deliberation" and hence would not encompass a motion to take a decision or act.
Smits, supra note 11, at 170.
130 EC Treaty, art. 109b(2).
131 Whether this approach is justifiable will be discussed in Part VI.C, infra.
1f2 EC Treaty, art. 109j(4).
133 EC Treaty, art. 109a.
"' Note that in exercising its assent power, the Parliament must either vote to approve or to
disapprove, and thus veto the Council's proposed legislation. The Parliament cannot amend the
proposal, nor require its reconsideration by the Council. Accordingly, the Parliament's large share in
legislative power in the codecision procedure is probably preferable in practice to its power to
assent.
135 EC Treaty, art. 105b.
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action to amend certain key provisions of the Statute of the ESCB. 36
Parliament will exercise a limited power of surveillance or monitoring of the
ESCB once the latter commences operations. Article 109b(3) prescribes that the
ECB must provide an annual report on the ESCB's operations and upon its
monetary policies to the European Parliament (as well as to the Council,
Commission and, somewhat unusually but showing the high profile of the report,
to the European Council). The Parliament may hold "a general debate" upon the
report.137 In addition, relevant competent committees of Parliament may request
the President of the ECB and other Executive Board members to come to a
hearing (or correlatively, ECB Executive Board members may request to be
heard by such committees).
Thus far I have described the role and functions of the ECB and the ESCB
with regard to its conduct of monetary policy within the Member States
participating in the third stage of monetary union. What, however, happens with
regard to the "States with a derogation" that do not join in the third stage,
either because they have opt out rights (Denmark and the United Kingdom), or
because they were unable to meet the convergence criteria or other preconditions
for participation in the third stage (probably Greece and Sweden, and perhaps
other Member States) 38? After all, the European Monetary Institute is to be
liquidated when the ECB is created.
The TEU does not cover this matter in any detail, but Article 1091(3) cross-
references the Protocol on the Statute of the ESCB and the ECB which does so
in Articles 43-53.139 A General Council is to be constituted, composed of the
President and Vice-President of the ECB (but not the other six Executive Board
members) together with the governors of the central banks of both the
participating States and the "States with a derogation," not yet (or not ever)
participating in the third stage. 40 The Governing Council takes over the tasks
previously performed by the EMI in coordinating the monetary policies of such
Member States with a derogation, advising them on how to attain the
convergence criteria, monitoring their participation in a new Exchange Rate
Mechanism, and so forth. The Governing Council would, of course, disappear
when (or if) all Member States qualify to participate, or opt to join in the final
stage of monetary union.
Finally, the Maastricht Treaty also deals with international agreements in the
monetary sphere in a complicated provision, Article 109, which constitutes a
136 EC Tfreaty, art. 106(5).
3 The Parliament's "general debate" upon the ECB's annual report may become as important a
review of the merits of the Community's monetary policy as is the Parliament's debate upon the
merits of the Commission's presentation of its annual agenda.
138 See infra Part VII.C.
139 The Protocol is attached to the TEU.
11 For further discussion of the role and functions of the General Council, see Gormley & de
Haan, supra note 63, at 105-06; and Smits, supra note 11, at 97-98.
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derogation from the usual Community procedures for entering into international
agreements laid down in Article 228.' 41
The principal role is given to the Council which, acting unanimously, can
conclude any formal agreements on exchange rates with third countries, after
consulting the Parliament and the ECB (Article 109(1)).142 Such a "formal
agreement" on exchange rate systems is presumably intended to cover a Bretton
Woods type of arrangement. In the absence of any such "formal agreement"
(and such a formal agreement presently does not seem very likely), the Council
may, acting by qualified majority, formulate "general orientations" for exchange
rate policy which are usually to be binding on the ECB.' 43
Acting by qualified majority, the Council may also enter into binding
agreements with international organizations or third countries on monetary
matters.'" This is a power which is certain to be exercised, very likely soon
after the commencement of the third stage. The Commission does not have the
power to negotiate these arrangements, as it usually does under Article 228.
Instead, under Article 109(3), the Council, acting on a Commission
recommendation and after consulting the ECB, decides how negotiations shall be
conducted, which may well mean that Council representatives will do the
negotiating directly. The Commission is only given the comfort that it "shall be
fully associated with the negotiations." Manifestly, the Member States want the
Council to have the central power position in the sensitive area of international
monetary relations and affairs. As a practical matter, however, since so much of
international monetary relations consists of informal arrangements and
understandings between central banks, the ECB may develop a major role in
Community external monetary affairs. As Professor Slot has well observed, "the
outside world, i.e., central banks, will see the ECB as the institution to do
business with."' 45
141 Smits provides a detailed, valuable analysis of the Community's external relations in the
monetary field under Article 109. Smits, supra note 11, at 365-454. Considerable specific attention is
paid to the impact upon the International Monetary Fund in id. at 429-50. Italianer provides a helpful
analysis of what the drafters intended to achieve through the quite complicated language of Article
109. Italianer, supra note 39, at 89-90. For an expert appraisal of the possible Community role in the
International Monetary Fund, see R. Martha, The Fund Agreement and the Surrender of Monetary
Sovereignty to the European Community, 30 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 749 (1993).
142 Either the Commission or the ECB must initially recommend the agreement to the Council.
Moreover, the consultation required with the ECB is intended to ensure the reaching of "a consensus
consistent with the objective of price stability," which suggests that the ECB has somewhat more
than a purely advisory role. Professor Slot describes the ECB's position to be "somewhere between
consultation and assent." Slot, supra note 63, at 240.
143 See Italianer, supra note 39, at 241.
I" EC Treaty, art. 109(3).
"4 Slot, supra note 63, at 241. An issue that is particularly sensitive and wide-open is how the
International Monetary Fund will be restructured in order to adapt to the new Community role in
international monetary affairs. See the detailed analysis in Smits, supra note 11, at 434-52.
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VI. CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL ISSUES CONCERNING THE EMU
STRUCTURE
Not surprisingly, the complex Economic and Monetary Union provisions of
the Maastricht Treaty proved to be among the most controversial during the
ratification debates in 1992-1993. Many Member State citizens, and a substantial
number of political party leaders, felt that the creation of the ESCB would result
in centralized and bureaucratic Community regulation, instead of national self-
determination, in an area of great political, economic and social importance. This
feeling certainly contributed to the adverse June 1992 ratification referendum in
Denmark, and the narrow level of support for ratification in the September 1992
French referendum and the July 1993 U.K. Parliament vote.'4 It is noteworthy
that the favorable 1993 Danish referendum only occurred after the December
1992 Edinburgh European Council meeting expressly recognized Denmark's
exercise of its Treaty Protocol option to remain outside of the third stage of
EMU. 147
Even if one supports the basic concept of monetary union, the Maastricht
Treaty provisions on EMU and the institutional structure devised for the
monetary union raise interesting and serious constitutional and legal issues. The
first issue covered in this Part is whether all of the detailed provisions on EMU
are so crucial in nature as to merit their inclusion in the Treaty or annexed
Protocols, as opposed to their presentation in secondary legislation. Second, the
motive for the Treaty emphasis on the independence of the central bank system
is set forth, but not without query as to whether this principle should be
enshrined in the Treaty itself. Linked to this is a critical question: should not
Parliament have been given a substantial share in the process of creating EMU,
or in its subsequent operations, an issue which is an aspect of the famous (or
infamous) "democratic deficit" of the Community. Also linked is the importance
of judicial review within the monetary structure by the Court of Justice, an
aspect of the essential rule of law. Finally, the last section queries the Treaty-
based priority given to price stability as the pre-eminent goal of the ECB's
monetary policy, and contrasts this with the wider policy perspectives of the
U.S. Federal Reserve and The Netherlands Central Bank. Note is taken here of
the Treaty of Amsterdam emphasis on attaining high levels of employment,
raising the question whether the ECB ought not to give this new Treaty goal a
high priority in its monetary policy decisions.
A. The Treaty Force of Detailed Provisions on EMU
The Court of Justice in the famous Les Verts judgment described the Treaty
Establishing the European Economic Community and the other constitutive
146 For a discussion of the difficulties in ratifying the Treaty on European Union, and the reaction
of the European Council, see Roger J. Goebel, The European Union Grows: The Constitutional
Impact of the Accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden, 18 Fordham Int'l LJ. 1092, 1110-13
(1995).
1 European Council Decision, Problems Raised by Denmark, supra note 89, at 2.
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treaties as a "constitutional charter,"'4 a characterization repeated with even
greater force to justify the Court's reasoning when it struck down aspects of the
European Economic Area Agreement in its European Economic Area Opinion.149
If anything, the Treaty on European Union seems even more aptly to be
described as a type of "constitutional charter," because of the TEU's broader
articulation of the goals of the Union, its creation of a "citizenship of the
Union," and its further transfer of elements of national sovereignty to a supra-
national institutional structure.
Accordingly, the decision taken by the Rome Intergovernmental Conference,
and confirmed by the European Council, to place so many complex and detailed
provisions on EMU in the Maastricht Treaty, or in Protocols which have Treaty
force, is certainly a debatable one. Many of these provisions would seem to be
more suitably embodied in secondary legislation, which could then be adjusted
to meet changing needs. As it is, revisions in many provisions of relatively
secondary importance can only occur through Treaty or Protocol Amendment.
This is not only time-consuming and cumbersome, but carries as a consequence
the obligation to resort to popular referenda in some Member States in order to
achieve ratification of the amendments. In contrast, the rules governing the
structure and operations of the Federal Reserve in the U.S., or national central
banks in Europe, are essentially embodied in legislation.' s
The motive for the extensive use of Treaty provisions for the structure of
EMU, and the description of the stages and conditions for its attainment,
presumably was to ensure unanimous backing from the Member States at the
outset, and greater certainty in the progressive execution of the successive stages
and in the ultimate structure (e.g., with regard to the firm date of January 1,
1999 for the start of the third stage, or with regard to the principle of
independence for the ECB and the national central banks).
Although undoubtedly the goals of Economic and Monetary Union, and
certain key structural features, merit a place in the Treaty, it may be doubted
that a number of details of planning or policy belong there. Already the Treaty
reference to ECU as the name for the single currency in Articles 3a and Article
109 is misleading, because the December 1995 Madrid European Council chose
the name "euro" instead. Smits contends, and is almost certainly correct, that it
is "unquestionable" that the TEU intended the name of the single currency to
be 'ECU" or "ecu" ("ECU" was used in the English Treaty text, and "ecu" in
the French).'5' The single currency's name should properly have been amended
11 Parti 6cologiste "Les Verts" v. Parliament, Case 294/83, 1986 E.C.R. 1339, 1365.
'4 Opinion 1/91, 1991 E.C.R. 1-6079, 6102.
1-1 Professor Louis has well remarked that in no other legal system has the organic law governing
a central bank system been raised to constitutional status; it is always, and properly, capable of
modification by the legislature. Jean-Victor Louis, The Project of a European Central Bank, in
Financial and Monetary Integration in the European Economic Community 13, 17 (Jules Stuyck ed.,
1993) [hereinafter Financial and Monetary Integration in the EEC].
"I' Smits, supra note 11, at 490. The European Council conclusions referred to "ECU" as a prior
"generic term" for European currency unit, but it was never so defined in the Maastricht Treaty.
Bull. EU 12-1995, at 10. See text accompanying note 260, infra. Smits rejects the view that the term
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in the Treaty of Amsterdam, but no such action was taken. The failure to foresee
the need to enable legislation to adopt certain essential rules in advance of the
third stage has meant that the important regulation on continuity of contracts,
discussed in Part IX, has had to be adopted by the use of Article 235, and the
equally important regulation on the introduction of the euro cannot be adopted at
all until the number of Member States participating in third stage is set and the
ECB is constituted.
Indeed, the fixing of the January 1, 1999 date for the start of the third stage
irrevocably in Treaty Article 109j(4) is a very debatable proposition. The efforts
to adhere to that timetable have led to severe economic strains in many Member
States, and only the application of the convergence criteria in a rather elastic
fashion will enable the date to be met. 5 2 One may wonder whether 2000 or
2001 might not have been more propitious dates, and query whether the TEU
needed to fix a terminal date, or might rather have better set parameters for a
final date, leaving the final timetable to be set by a European Council closer in
time to the event.
B. The Principle of Independence
Not only is the principle of independence for the European Central Bank, and
all national central banks participating in the ESCB, given Treaty (or
constitutional) status in EC Treaty Article 107 (repeated in Article 7 of the
Protocol on the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB), but it is stated in very
strong terms: members of these bodies shall neither "seek or take instructions
from Community institutions or bodies, from any government of a Member
State, or from any other body." Moreover, the Community institutions and
Member State governments pledge to "respect this principle and not to seek to
influence" the ECB or the national central banks. The decision to give the
Executive Board members a non-renewable, but relatively long eight year term,
was linked to the principle of independence-it was felt that any possibility of
reappointment might open the way for undue influence on the Executive Board
members. 5 3 Moreover, Executive Board members can only be removed from
"ECU" could be regarded as an acronym for "European currency unit." He further argues that the
European Council did not have the power to change the name, which could only be done by Treaty
amendment. Smits, supra note 11, at 491-92. He notes that Commission President Jacques Delors
took the same position in 1993 in answer to a question from Parliament See Answer given by Mr.
Delors on behalf of the Commission, 1993 OJ. (C 16) 10.
152 See infra Part VII.
5 Pohl, supra note 119, at 84. Smits describes the motive to be "to free the incumbent from
political considerations concerning a renewal of his or her term of office." Smits, supra note 11, at
156. However, he queries this, observing that central bank governors whose term of office is
renewable often have a "staunchly independent tradition." Id., citing the Federal Reserve Board and
The Netherlands Central Bank. An eight year term was presumably chosen because that is the term
of office of Bundesbank Directorate members.
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office for incapacity or "serious misconduct" by a proceeding before the Court
of Justice, ensuring a judicial rather than a political decision.'
Furthermore, this Treaty-enshrined principle of independence applies not only
to the Executive Board and the Governing Council of the ECB, but also to all
the national central banks participating in the ESCB.'55 The policy motive for
this is obviously to ensure that national central banks can effectively operate as
part of the ESCB and that they might have greater leeway in pursuing the goal
of price stability and monetary stability on the national level. 56 As previously
observed in Part V, Article 108 of the EC Treaty requires Member States to
ensure that the national rules governing their central banks are "compatible with
this Treaty" prior to the creation of the ESCB, implicitly meaning that
independence of national central banks should be attained during the second
stage. 57
The motive for this strong declaration of independence for the ECB and
national central banks lies in the manifest success of the Bundesbank in
achieving a virtually continuous state of stable monetary conditions, low
inflation, and a solid currency since the German economic recovery under
Chancellor Konrad Adenauer in the 1950's.158 Ludwig Erhard, then Finance
Minister and Adenauer's successor as Chancellor, advocated a strong,
independent central bank. Much of the success enjoyed by the Bundesbank in its
regulatory efforts has been attributed both within and outside Germany to the
basic legislation governing the Bundesbank, enhanced by custom, according it
substantial independence from the political sphere. As former Bundesbank
President Pohl has asserted: "Only an independent institution is in a position to
resist the ever-recurring wishes of politicians to prescribe monetary policy
targets which are often inconsistent with the objective of stability, such as the
stabilization of exchange rates or the promotion of growth and employment or
the balancing of regional disequilibria."' 59
Prior to the Maastricht Treaty, most other European central banks were not
granted totally independent regulatory powers by legislation. Although custom
14 Protocol on the Statute of the ESCB and the ECB, at art. 11.4. Further, only the Governing
Council or the Executive Board itself can institute the procedure. For analysis of this topic, see
Smits, supra note 11, at 163.
I55 To safeguard their independence, members of national central banks must have a minimum
term of five years and be removed only for incapacity or "serious misconduct" in a proceeding
whose decision can be appealed to the Court of Justice. Protocol of the Statute of the ESCB and the
ECB, at art. 14.2. See Gormley & de Haan, supra note 63, at 107.
'5 Harden, supra note 114, at 155.
15 See also EC Treaty, art. 109e(5).
159 Gormley & de Haan, supra note 63, at 95. Smits cites a number of studies correlating central
bank independence in Germany, The Netherlands, and Switzerland with low inflation rates and
smaller public deficits. Smits, supra note 11, at 152-54.
159 Pohl, supra note 119, at 83. Rosa Lastra, a lawyer with the International Monetary fund, argues
that a central bank should be independent in order to check the tendency of political leaders to
manipulate "monetary policy for short-term political ends." She further argues that the "skills,
expertise and superior economic qualifications of central bankers compared to politicians . .. better
guarantee a more objective, more 'neutral' and faster decision-making process." Rosa Lastra, The
Independence of the European System of Central Banks, 33 Harv. Int'l U. 475, 477 (1992).
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usually accorded the central banks wide discretion in decision making,
governments did from time to time block central bank decisions or, more rarely,
dictate monetary policy to be implemented by the central banks. This was
particularly true in France, but also in some measure in Italy, Spain and the
United Kingdom.
France, Italy, Spain and the U.K. have now all acted to adopt the principle of
independence for their central banks. It remains to be seen whether the principle
will be respected in practice, especially in those Member States that have
customarily possessed political control over central banks. Efforts by the
executive branch, and especially finance ministers, to influence central bank
decisions on interest rates or liquidity may well occur. After all, although the
Commission is also guaranteed independence by Article 157 of the EC Treaty, it
is well known that on occasion Member States have tried to influence
commissioners initially nominated by them. In August 1995, press reports
indicated that Commission President Santer had formally rebuked the German
government for its efforts to incite the two German members of the Commission
to oppose the draft consumer warranty directive. 16°
Independence of the ECB does not mean that it will be free from all
commentary or political pressure. The Commission in its initial advocacy of the
principle of independence in March 1990 noted that the central monetary
institution must be "democratically accountable [as] a necessary complement to
its independence in order to make its policies acceptable to the public at
large."' 16 Smits has well said that "the counterpose to independence is
accountability. The central banks .. .have to account for their policies and
activities before the political organs ... [and] come under the scrutiny of the
judiciary.' ' 162
As previously noted, EC Treaty Article 109b grants the President of the
Council and a member of the Commission the right to "participate" without a
vote in Governing Council (but not Executive Board) meetings. The word"participate" implies a right to speak and join in deliberations, not simply a
right to attend silently. The Council and Commission representatives may
legitimately seek to influence the ECB.163 Indeed, the President of the Council
may even "submit a motion for deliberation."'"
Moreover, the Parliament may at least make its views known in the debate
following the ECB's annual report to Parliament165 Perhaps more important,
competent Parliament committees may "hear" the President of the ECB and
11 Emma Tucker, German Attempt to Influence Vote Earns Brussels Reprimand, Fim. Tines, Aug.
3, 1995, at 10.
,61 Supra note 38, at 8.
162 Smits, supra note 11, at 169.
'6 As Smits remarks, "to freely opine on the right course of monetary policy." Id. at 171. Harden
describes their role as contributing "to the formulation of monetary policy by discussion." Harden,
supra note 114, at 153.
164 But, arguably, not for decision or action. See Smits, supra note 11, at 171.
' EC Treaty, art. 109b(3).
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other Executive Board members.'"6 Since committees may include members
specialized in legal and monetary affairs, and committee meetings can be
scheduled at times of major monetary policy decisions, a certain degree of
influence can be brought to bear on the ECB.167 Furthermore, such ECB contacts
with Parliament serve another valuable role, that of informing the public of the
ECB's monetary policies and its views on current monetary issues and
conditions.' 68
A final point is that a legitimate question may be raised as to the wisdom of
incorporating the principle of independence into the EC Treaty as a
constitutional principle. As Professor Snyder has observed, this gives the ECB
"formally speaking," greater independence than the U.S. Federal Reserve Board
or the Bundesbank.' 69 On a comparative note, the U.S. Federal Reserve Board
does not enjoy constitutional status and, although it enjoys great independence
by custom, nothing prevents the Congress from adopting legislation mandating
certain goals or policies, a power that the Congress has on rare occasion
exercised. 70 Indeed, even the threat of legislation raised by a powerful
congressional committee may well have some influence on the Federal Reserve.
In the European context, The Netherlands Central Bank enjoys a high reputation
for its efficacy in monetary control, even though its independence is largely
based on custom and, as noted previously, its status is determined by legislation
and it can be subjected to binding instructions from the Ministry of Finance.' 7'
However desirable a very high level of functional independence for the ESCB
may be in practice, it remains quite debatable that the principle should be
enshrined in the EC Treaty, with constitutional import, rather than in some form
of basic secondary legislation. In times of political or economic crises, it may be
plausibly contended that the political leadership should have some capacity to
overrule central bank decisions.172 This observation leads naturally to the next
legal and political issue meriting review, the "democratic deficit."
166 However, Professor Harden contends that the text does not give Parliament the right to compel
ECB members to appear before it, nor the Executive Board a right to appear at will before
Parliament Harden, supra note 114, at 161.
167 As Smits observes, the ECB can better "assess the needs and preferences [of the public]
expressed through the political process." Smits, supra note 11, at 170.
168 Id. at 169.
'6 Snyder, supra note 62, at 78.
"7 The best-known example is the Full Employment and Balance Growth Act of 1978 (popularly
known as the Humphrey-Hawkins Act), which required the Federal Reserve to consider a variety of
factors in setting its objectives, notably "full employment and production." 15 U.S.C.A. § 3101, at
§ 3101(c).
17' Gormley & de Haan, supra note 63, at 98-99.
"7 It is well known that Chancellor Kohl's government overruled the Bundesbank in setting the
monetary terms for German reunification in 1990. See Lastra, supra note 159, at 495. Gormley & de
Haan argue that economic theory may also justify a political override of central bank decisions in
rare instances of economic shocks. Gormley & de Haan, supra note 63, at 109-12. Smits specifically
rejects this view. Smits, supra note 11, at 185 n. 161.
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C. The "Democratic Deficit" of the Monetary Union
Over the years, Parliament's endeavors to gain greater powers have been
supported by academic and media commentary complaining of the "democratic
deficit" of the Community. While the Rome Intergovernmental Conference
experts devised the Maastrich Treaty provisions on EMU, Parliament in several
resolutions urged that it be given a considerable role in the evolution of
monetary union and in its operations once constituted, specifically demanding
"democratic supervision" and "public accountability" of the ESCB.'" In large
measure, this did not occur, probably because the political leadership of the
Member States did not want Parliament to interfere with the decisions taken en
route to EMU, and because the drafting experts insisted on the principle of ECB
independence in operations after its creation.
The March 1996 Turin European Council decision to the effect that the TEU's
monetary provisions should not be placed on the IGC agenda for reexamination
by the 1996 Turin Intergovernmental Conference' 74 had the consequence that
Parliament's position could not be improved in the Treaty of Amsterdam.
Indeed, as noted earlier, 75 the parliamentary cooperation procedure survives in
the monetary chapter, although being replaced by the co-decision process
everywhere else in the Treaty of Amsterdam.
Perhaps the most important and regrettable illustrations of the "democratic
deficit" are Parliament's meager involvement in the political determinations in
the shift to the third stage. It may be appropriate that Parliament is only
informed in the process of providing economic and monetary guidelines to
Member States during the second stage, 76 since this is a highly technical
process. But the EC Treaty provides that Parliament is only to be consulted in
the Council decision identifying the Member States which fulfill the necessary
conditions for participation in the third stage, 7 7 and in the subsequent
designation of the Executive Board. 78
The determination of those Member States that qualify for the third stage is
not purely a technical matter. As will be examined in Part VII, this is a highly
political decision. The sensitivity and importance of the decision is underlined
17 The October 25, 1989 Resolution on Economic and Monetary Union demanded "procedures
for democratic supervision" of the ESCB. 1989 OJ. (C 304) 43, 45. The May 16, 1990 Resolution
on Economic and Monetary Union urged "public accountability" of the ESCB as appropriate "in a
democratically ordered society." 1990 OJ. (C 149) 66, 68. Later, the October 10, 1990 Resolution
on Economic and Monetary Union urged that Parliament be given either the power to assent, or
share in a codecision procedure in key decisions for the creation of EMU and the legal status of the
ECU, and give its assent to the nomination of the ECB board members. 1990 OJ. (C 284) 62, 63-
65.
'174 The European Council's agenda for the IGC is contained in Bull. EU 3-1996, at 9-12.
17 See supra, note 122.
176 EC Treaty, arts. 103(2), 103(4) & 104c(10). However, Professor Louis contends that the failure
to include Parliament in the process prevents any "effective inter-institutional dialogue for the
elaboration of the guidelines." Louis, supra note 150, at 7.
rn EC Treaty, art. 109j(4).
'7 EC Treaty, art. 109a(2).
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by the unusual requirement that the Council be composed of Heads of State and
Government for this purpose-a unique example of providing for a Community
legal act at the highest political level.
A decision of parallel significance to determining third stage participants is
that on the admission of new Member States into the EU, governed by Article 0
of the TEU. Under this provision, the Council can act only after receiving the
assent of the European Parliament, i.e., the Parliament has a veto power. Why
should not the Parliament likewise have the right to assent to the determination
of the member States comprising the final stage of monetary union? Surely such
a decision of capital political importance ought to have the strongest democratic
support. The risk that Parliament would block the decision is as minimal as the
risk that Parliament would block an accession-although admittedly that risk
might enable Parliament to exert some degree of influence on such a vital
decision.
One may legitimately wonder also why Parliament should not have a voice in
the designation of Executive Board members, as it has requested. 79 After all, in
the U.S. the President's nominees for the Federal Reserve Board are subject to
confirmation hearings and must be approved by the Senate. 80 (Indeed, in
Denmark, some Central Bank members are appointed by the parliament.1'8) Not
only is democratic legitimacy better respected by a system of formal hearings
and approval by the Parliament, but the process enables a careful and public
review of a nominee's credentials and policy views.
Once the monetary union is fully constituted and the ESCB operational, the
Parliament's role is also rather modest. It is true that Parliament must give its
assent to any Council legislation granting the ECB powers of prudential
supervision over credit institutions and other financial institutions, or in any
change in significant provisions of the Statute of the ESCB. s2 Otherwise the
principle of independence dictated that Parliament be given no role in the ESCB
system of monetary policy setting and regulation. As remarked previously, the
total insulation of monetary decision making from democratic control is certainly
a debatable proposition. Making it hard for Parliament to interfere with the
monetary expert bodies is one thing, making it impossible (by the Treaty force
of these provisions) is quite another.
Leading commentators have not been slow to raise their concern in this
regard. The strongest critique has been offered by Professors Gormley & de
Haan in their article, "The Democratic Deficit of the European Central Bank,"
which concludes that "monetary policy ultimately must be controlled by
democratically elected politicians," and urges reexamination of The Netherlands
," In its November 12, 1990 Resolution on EMU, supra note 173, Parliament requested the power
to assent to the designation of ECB board members.
M 12 U.S.C. § 242.
181 Lastra, supra note 159, at 483.
182 See EC Treaty, arts. 105(5) & 106(5). See also note 134, supra. As observed in the text
accompanying note 117, supra, the likelihood that the ECB will receive delegated powers in the
prudential supervision of financial institutions in its initial operations is not very great.
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and New Zealand models for central bank operations." 3 Professor Snyder
worries that the new structure for EMU decision-making "runs the risk of
serious problems of popular legitimacy."'' 8 4 Professor Louis notes that the TEU
provisions on the ESCB have given priority to the structural rules over"ensuring a democratic legitimacy of the new institutions." '
In contrast, former Bundesbank President Pohl contends that the ESCB
structure "would have an adequately democratic legal base if it came about by
an agreement between democratic governments, if the agreement were ratified
by democratically elected parliaments and if the system were provided with a
clearly defined mandate."186 In a rather balanced view, Smits concedes that ECB
"independence has been written in stone, a feature which may be considered at
variance with the imperatives of democracy," but he regards any alternative as"unacceptable politically" because of the overriding concern for price stability
and security in managing the new single currency.'87
Like several other commentators, Smits urges full use of Parliament's
surveillance powers described earlier (the Parliament's "general debate" upon
the ECB's annual report, together with the possibility of committee hearings)ss
in order to achieve "democratic accountability" of the ECB.189 He stresses that
if the ECB is open to dialogue with Parliament, and if Parliament is sufficiently
expert and prudent in its exercise of its limited powers, the dialogue may not
only provide valuable monetary and economic information to the general public,
but may also enable the popular representatives to exert a genuine influence
upon the ECB's decision making.' t ' He urges Parliament to have well-informed
MEPs with "eminent economic credentials... entering the arena of debate with
the ECB President."' 191
In view of the imperative need to ensure that the European Community have
an adequate level of democratic legitimacy, one can only hope that Smits will
prove an accurate prophet and that the Parliament's surveillance of the ECB will
be far-reaching and effective. Professor Harden contrasts the rather meager TEU
provisions in this regard with the more precise reporting obligations placed upon
I' Gormley & de Haan, supra note 63, at 112.
194 Snyder, supra note 62, at 77.
195 Louis, supra note 150, at 17. Professor Louis elsewhere complains that "[v]ery severe
measures will have to be taken by Member States and sacrifices asked of European citizens without
democratic accountability of the institutions concerned." Louis, supra note 150, at 9.
186 Pohl, supra note 119, at 87.
187 Smits, supra note 11, at 176. Lastra agrees, arguing that monetary stability is "a necessary
condition for a stable democracy" and the need for central bank independence to achieve monetary
stability represents a justification for the exception to democratic control. Lastra, supra note 159, at
479.
188 See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
189 Smits, supra note 11, at 169; see also Pipkorn, supra note 63, at 281. Gormley & de Haan
speak of "independence under observation." Gormley & de Haan, supra note 63, at 106. Lastra
argues for "accountable independence" as a solution to the "democracy deficit." Lastra, supra note
159, at 481-82.
190 Smits, supra note 11, at 169-76.
191 Id. at 174.
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the Federal Reserve, which must provide to Congress twice a year a detailed
report on monetary policy and a number of relevant economic conditions,
together with its objectives and plans. Furthermore, the Fed is subject to fairly
strict oversight by both Senate and House Committees. 92 Whether Congress is
able to exercise any significant degree of influence upon the Federal Reserve's
general conduct of monetary policy is certainly questionable, but at least the
reporting system ensures a salutary publicity for national economic and
monetary policies and conditions. Perhaps a parallel development may ultimately
occur in EMU.
D. Judicial Review by the Court of Justice
The Treaty's provisions on the role of the Court of Justice in the monetary
union's operations have a dual importance: the Court will serve to guarantee the
powers and the independence of the ECB, but it will also provide a check on
ECB power that is all the more significant in view of the "democratic deficit."
As Professor Slot suggests, the TEU structure "provides greater judicial
protection and control than presently exists in several of the Member States.
This may counter-balance the lack of Parliamentary control."' 93 Smits observes
that national central banks traditionally have not been "subject to elaborately
regulated judicial review," but that the "extensively regulated legal framework"
of the ESCB is natural, since "[t]he Community is based on respect for the rule
of law."'194
As previously discussed in Part V, to ensure the rule of law, the Court of
Justice has jurisdiction in actions brought by the ECB "to protect its
prerogatives" against the other institutions or Member States under EC Treaty
Articles 173 and 175, as well as in actions brought by Member States and the
other institutions against the ECB. It is quite likely that the Court of Justice may
be called upon to decide disputes over the extent of ECB competence or power
either in conflicts with the Community institutions, or with national ministries of
finance or central banks"~ (commonly called "turf battles"), for example, in the
field of monetary supervision of financial institutions. Also, although the scope
of ECB and national central bank independence will probably be more
guaranteed by custom, it is not inconceivable that the precise parameters of
independence may have to be settled by the Court.
It is unlikely that the ECB will be as eager as the Parliament is to sue the
other institutions, but the ECB's power to do so may still prove a useful
safeguard. The Court may also have to decide the force and extent of Treaty
obligations and ECB decisions in proceedings against recalcitrant national central
192 Harden, supra note 114, at 161-62. The reporting requirements are mandated by statute. See
infra notes 209 & 210.
191 Slot, supra note 63, at 248.
194 Smits, supra note 11, at 106.
195 For further analysis of some complicated issues that may arise, see id. at 107-08. See also Slot,
supra note 63, at 245-46.
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banks or private enterprises under EC Treaty Article 180d and under the
Protocol on the Statutes of the ESCB and EC, Article 35 .196
Moreover, not only Member States and Community political institutions, but
individuals may to some extent question ECB regulations and decisions either
directly under Article 173 or indirectly in national court proceedings, through the
Article 177 reference procedure. Article 190's requirement that regulations and
decisions adopted by the Community political institutions must have a reasoned
basis is apt to be applied by analogy to ECB regulations and decisions.197 It is
likely that recourse to a legal challenge of an ECB decision would rarely occur,
and the Court is certain to give a broad field of discretion to the ECB's
monetary measures. Nonetheless, the possibility of review by the Court of
Justice should serve as a restraint against arbitrary, poorly reasoned or
inadequately justified rules or decisions, in line with well-established Court
precedents on the need for a reasoned basis for Council, Commission and
Parliamentary acts.'19
Another issue that may require Court review is the extent of confidentiality of
ECB and ESCB decision-making.' 99 This issue has had to be addressed already
with regard to the extent of bank secrecy in application of the First Banking
Directive 2m in a criminal proceeding involving a bank. The Court's judgement
setting limits on the extent of bank secrecy in Hillegom v. Hillenius. ' caused the
amendment of the bank confidentiality provision in the First Banking Directive
by Article 16 in the Second Banking Directive,2 2 which permits exceptions to
bank secrecy obligations in criminal and bankruptcy proceedings. The sensitive
nature of ECB or national central bank confidentiality is manifestly more
marked than that of commercial banks, but the Court of Justice may nonetheless
impose some limits on such confidentiality in order to protect other public
interests.
,96 Smits, supra note 11, at 108-09. See also Slot's discussion of whether the ECB has the power
to fine national central banks. Slot, supra note 63, at 246.
,9 Gormley & de Haan, supra note 63, at 104.
,g For an analysis of when ECB guidelines may be deemed acts subject to judicial review, see
Smits, supra note 11, at 109-10. Leading examples of cases in which the Court struck down
Commission decisions for failure to provide sufficient reasoning or for failure to permit the private
party concerned to state its views in the proceeding are: Germany v. Commission, Case 24/62, 1963
E.C.R. 63; and Transocean Marine Paint Association v. Commission, Case 14174, 1974 E.C.R. 1063.
The Court has also struck down a national central bank interest rate subsidy when it violated
applicable Community rules. Commission v. Greece, Case 63/87, 1988 E.C.R. 2875.
,99 Smits finds the Treaty language on the ESCB's "professional secrecy" obligations
unfortunately vague and suspects that the Court of Justice may ultimately have to provide
clarification. Smits, supra note 11, at 110-11.
First Council Directive 77/780/EEC on credit institutions, 1977 O.J. (L 322) 30.
20 Case 110/84, 1985 E.C.R. 3947.
m Second Council Directive 89/646/EEC on credit institutions, 1989 OJ. (L 386) 1.
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E. The ECB Objective of Price Stability and the Amsterdam Treaty Goal of
High Employment
EC Treaty Article 105(1), quoted in Part V above, set "price stability" as the
"primary objective" of the ESCB, thus accepting the German argument that the
Bundesbank's monetary policy success was due in large measure to its principal
emphasis on price stability. Price stability is equated with a low inflation rate for
products and services, especially consumer products and services.3M Although
the Treaty fixes no specific target, price stability is usually seen as requiring an
inflation rate lower than 2%, preferably approaching zero.204 Naturally the ECB
will have considerable discretion in fixing a target rate of low inflation, or no
inflation, for the Community in view of evolving economic and monetary
conditions. It will certainly be subject to criticism and political pressure from
Parliament and the other Community institutions if the inflation rate is seen to
be at too high a level.
As a secondary duty, the ESCB is required by Article 105 to "support the
general economic policies in the Community." 2 The ESCB is also to "act in
accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free
competition," a major innovation in the Maastricht Treaty urged by Germany as
a "ground rule" for ESCB action.1 Article 3a(3) lists some other guiding
principles which the ESCB should respect: "sound public finances and monetary
conditions and a sustainable balance of payments." But although the ESCB will
certainly often develop rules and shape decisions to achieve one or another of
these secondary objectives, Article 105(1) unequivocally declares these to be
"without prejudice to the objective of price stability," which is manifestly given
the primary emphasis. 7
German fears of inflation are understandable, given the economic disaster of
the 1920s, and Germany's enviable post World War H record of low inflation is
certainly in large measure due to Bundesbank policies. A low inflation rate
encourages long-term investment, confidence in long-term supply contracts,
market stability, greater certainty in budgetary planning and tax collection, stable
2 There is no Treaty definition of "price stability," but the universal view is that it is identified
with a low level of inflation. Smits describes it as "internal price stability" (the maintenance of
domestic market purchasing power for goods and services), rather than "external price stability" (the
maintenance of a stable value for a currency in comparison with other currencies). Smits, supra note
11, at 184.
2m See note 108, supra.
2 For an analysis of what might be considered to be Community economic policies, see Smits,
supra note 11, at 187-192.
206 Italianer, supra note 39, at 69-70. This principle of an "open market economy with free
competition" may prevent the ECB from carrying out rescue operations for weak banks in times of
crisis, or from executing subsidy measures. Louis, supra note 150, at 18; Smits, supra note 11, at
190-92.
2 Smits argues that the ECB must always choose a course of action more favorable to stable
prices than an alternative which serves other valid goals but is not as favorable to stable prices.
Smits, supra note 11, at 187.
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securities markets, insurance for long-term savings, social protection for
pensioners, and so on.2
But giving primary attention to a low inflation rate may handicap Member
State action to combat economic and monetary crises and, in particular, efforts
to reduce high unemployment and concomitant social distress. Economists are,
not surprisingly, divided on their assessment of the degree of social and
economic harm produced by high inflation versus that produced by high
unemployment, and upon the precise nature of the link between inflation rates
and unemployment rates.
The goal of price stability is often not granted particular priority in guiding
the monetary policies of national central banks. Before the Maastricht Treaty,
certain Member States, such as The Netherlands, assigned their central bank a
broader goal than that of price stability: the goal of promoting general social and
economic welfare. Most Member State governments and central banks looked to
other goals in the setting of monetary policy. On a comparative note, in the
United States the Federal Reserve places a high premium on maintaining price
stability, but that is not its only concern. The statutory goal set for the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve system is to "promote effectively the goals of
maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates."' 0
It is noteworthy that for the Federal Reserve price stability is not given special
priority and that "maximum employment" is a specific goal, indeed the first
mentioned. The Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978 added
detailed bi-annual reporting requirements for the Federal Reserve, including
specifically "past and prospective developments in employment, unemployment,
production, investment, real income, productivity, international trade and
payments, and prices. '210
The Federal Reserve itself has said, in describing its goals, that
[m]any analysts believe that the central bank should focus primarily on achieving
price stability [but] . . . tension can arise between efforts to reduce inflation and
efforts to maximize employment and output... [or the need to confront] adverse
supply shocks, such as a bad agricultural harvest or a disruption in the price of oil
.... In these circumstances, makers of monetary policy must decide the extent to
which they should focus on defusing price pressures or on cushioning the loss of
output and employment. 21'
For the last two years, some monetary and economic specialists have urged that
the Federal Reserve raise interest rates to cut off incipient inflation because
unemployment dropped below 6%, and then below 5% (and is currently 4.7%),
but Chairman Alan Greenspan and the Federal Reserve Board have declined to
Even Gormley & de Haan agree on the benefits of price stability. See Gormley & de Haan,
supra note 63, at 109-10.
209 12 U.S.C.A. § 225a.
210 15 U.S.C.A. § 3101 et. seq.
211 Board of Governors, The Federal Reserve System-Purposes and Functions 17-18 (Fed. Res.
Publ., 8th ed. 1994).
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do so. 212 The inflation rate has continued to be around 2%. The debate is
ongoing in the U.S., but it is clear that the Federal Reserve, faithful to its
statutory mandate, is sensitive to concerns for a low unemployment rate as well
as for a low inflation rate.
In view of this much more balanced and nuanced presentation of the Federal
Reserve's goal in developing monetary policy, one may seriously question the
wisdom of entrenching "price stability" as the primary goal of the ESCB and
the ECB in the Maastricht Treaty. This is particularly true in view of the current
grave problem of high unemployment levels. The 1991-1994 recession in the
Community was quite severe and produced historically high unemployment
virtually everywhere. 2 13 Some Member States were especially hard hit-Finland,
Portugal and Spain had unemployment at or approaching 20%. Although
unemployment declined in many States during the 1994-1996 recovery, it still
averages over 10%, and in fact has increased in both France (now at 13%) and
Germany (currently over 12%).
Beginning with the December 1993 Brussels European Council,21 4 which
formally approved the Commission White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness
and Employment, 2 5 the Community has given priority attention to programs to
combat unemployment and promote stable, long-term jobs. After several
European Councils continued this emphasis, the March 1996 Turin European
Council directed the Turin Intergovernmental Council to take up the issue, 216
with the result that the Treaty of Amsterdam contains important provisions
concerning employment.
The Treaty of Amsterdam, signed on October 2, 1997 and now in the process
of ratification,21 7 highlights the importance of Community activity to promote
employment by amending TEU Article B to insert "a high level of
employment" as a Treaty goal. Similarly, Article 2 of the EC Treaty now
includes among the Community's tasks "a high level of employment and social
protection" immediately before "sustainable and non-inflationary growth."
The Amsterdam Treaty also inserted into the EC Treaty a new Title VIa on
Employment. A central provision is Article 109p(2), which states that "[t]he
objective of a high level of employment shall be taken into consideration in the
formulation and implementation of Community policies and objectives." The
212 See, e.g., Louis Uchitelle, Job Insecurity of Workers Is a Big Factor in Fed Policy-Greenspan
Lays Out Argument to Congress, N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1997, at D6; Richard W. Stevenson, Inflation
Whimpers. What's Next for Fed?, N.Y. Times, Jan. 31. 1998, at Dl.
213 The Community-wide unemployment rate hit a historical high of 10.9% in 1994. Commission,
General Report 1994, supra note 22, at point 30. The 10.9% average unemployment rate persisted
through the end of 1996. European Commission, General Report on the Activities of the European
Union 1996, at point 62 (1997) [hereinafter Commission, General Report 1996]. Statistics for 1997
are not yet available, but are not expected to show significant improvement
214 European Commission, Twenty-seventh General Report on the Activities of the European
Communities 1993, at point 16 (1994) [hereinafter Commission, General Report 1993].
215 COM (93) 700 final (December 1993).
216 Bull. EU 3-1996, at 10.
227 See supra note 122.
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European Council, the Council and the Commission are all expressly mandated
to implement this new emphasis on high employment.
Will the new Treaty provisions mandating efforts to attain high employment
have potential consequences for the European Central Bank? The text of Article
105(1) was not modified, but obviously a high level of employment is now an
integral part of the Community economic policies which the ESCB is required to
support. Will this new factor affect to some degree the ECB's primary emphasis
on price stability? Given the political realities-virtually all Member States
currently have liberal or social democratic governments-there is certainly the
possibility that the ESCB's policies will be influenced by the Member State
governments' desire to reduce unemployment. In the long run, it may be that the
ECB, like the Federal Reserve, may be obliged by pragmatic considerations to
give the goal of high employment virtual parity with that of price stability.
VII. THE SECOND STAGE AND THE CONVERGENCE CRITERIA
A. The Second Stage and the European Monetary Institute
When the Maastricht Treaty finally entered into effect on November 1, 1993,
its provisions delineating the stages of progress toward an Economic and
Monetary Union became operative. Denmark formally exercised its right to opt-
out of the third stage at the time of its ratification of the TEU in May 1993, and
thus will not (at least initially) participate in the ESCB, nor adopt the single
currency. The United Kingdom continues to hold open its option to participate or
not, although, as indicated in Part VII.C below, the Labor government of Prime
Minister Blair is expected to try to convince the British people to support U.K.
participation in the third stage sometime after 1999.
However, in spite of the more skeptical stances of Denmark and the U.K., the
other Member States remain committed to the EMU goal. The German
Parliament did insist during its ratification process that it provide a specific
assent to Germany's entry into the third stage immediately prior to that stage,
and the German Constitutional Court stressed the importance of that final
parliamentary assent in the court's well-known 1993 Maastricht judgment.2 18 In
effect, this means that the German government and its Parliament must review
the final decision-making process in spring 1998 that determines which Member
States qualify for entry into the third stage in function of their satisfaction of the
convergence criteria.21 9 In the 1993-1994 negotiations with Austria, Finland and
218 The German Constitutional Court's complex judgment of October 12, 1993 concluded that
Germany's ratification of the Treaty on European Union did not violate its Constitution, as amended
by a new Article 23 intended to facilitate the further transfer of sovereign powers envisioned by the
TEU. An English translation of the judgment is contained in Brunner v. European Union Treaty,
[1994] 1 C.M.L.R. 57. For an excellent analysis, see Matthias Herdegen, Maastricht and the German
Constitutional Court, 31 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 235 (1994). The judgment is summarized in
Bermann et al., 1998 Supplement, supra note 6, at 123-26.
219 See Smits, supra note 11, at 33-34. The Netherlands Parliament also stipulated during its
ratification of the TEU that it would scrutinize the process of determining which Member States
satisfied the convergence criteria. Smits contends that neither the Dutch nor the German
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Sweden, their commitment to join in the proposed monetary union was made a
condition for their accession, 220 and the 1995 Treaty of Accession accordingly
binds these Member States also to participate in the EMU. 22
As Article 109e of the EC Treaty provides, on January 1, 1994 the
Community entered into the second stage of preparation for EMU. Pursuant to
Article 109j(4), this stage is to be followed by the final one no later than
January 1, 1999. The European Monetary Institute, composed of the Governors
of each Member State central bank and a President named by common accord of
the Member States, was created on January 1, 1994.222 The October 1993
European Council meeting in Brussels established EMI's seat in Frankfurt,223 in
a decision reached with some difficulty because both Amsterdam and London
also sought this seat. (Note that the same decision specified that the European
Central Bank should also be sited in Frankfurt.) The first President of the EMI
was a highly respected banking expert, Alexandre Lamfalussy, formerly head of
the Bank of International Settlements in Basel.
Willem Duisenberg, the EMI's second president, who took office on July 1,
1997, and is to serve until the ECB replaces the EMI,2 4 is the former president
of The Netherlands Central Bank, well-known as an advocate of a strong central
bank and strict monetary policy. He is now regarded as the leading candidate to
become the first President of the European Central Bank.225
In 1994, the EMI commenced operations, first establishing its own procedures,
and then starting the task of advising Member States on their monetary policies.
Working with a small staff of experts (250 in 1997), the EMI issues an annual
report on monetary policy each April, monitors the EMS, and regularly prepares
studies and recommendations on aspects of monetary policy, banking and
parliamentary review can in any way prevent the respective government from entering the third stage
if it qualifies, because this is an absolute Treaty obligation. See id. at 133-34.
220 Participation in the Economic and Monetary Union was included among the key features of the
"acquis communautaire," or essential political and economic rules and doctrines of the Community,
that had to be accepted by the applicant states before the accession negotiations could take place.
See Goebel, supra note 146, at 1155. Somewhat surprisingly, since the opt outs provided by TEU
Protocols to Denmark and the U.K. were well known, none of the applicant states sought any similar
opt out of EMU. Id. at 1156. For a detailed description of the accession negotiations by two
Commission lawyers active in the process, see Dierk Booss & John Forman, Enlargement Legal and
Procedural Aspects, 32 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 95 (1995).
21 The three new Member States acceded to the Treaty on European Union, including its EMU
provisions, which had entered into force on November 1, 1993. The Act of Accession, containing
adjustments to the TEU necessitated by the addition of the new States is in 1994 OJ. (C 241) 21, as
modified by Council Decision of January 1, 1995, 1995 OJ. (L 1) 1 (making the revisions required
by Norway's failure to ratify the accession treaty).
22 Commission, General Report 1994, supra note 22, at point 38.
2r Bull. EC 10-1993, at 12.
27 Dr. Duisenberg's designation was made by the December 1996 Dublin European Council. Bull.
EU 12-1996, at 10.
.2" In view of Dr. Duisenberg's short term as President of the EMI (from July 1, 1997 to May
1998), observers assumed that his choice represented a tacit agreement to name him as the first ECB
President. This still seems probable, although the names of other candidates, notably that of the
president of the Bank of France, have been advanced.
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finance. 226 Article 109f mandates the EMI to prepare the "regulatory,
organizational and logistical framework" for the ESCB. Accordingly, together
with the Commission, the EMI has been providing the recommendations for
legislation and policy in preparing the transition to the third stage of monetary
union. In particular, the EMI has been responsible for the technical preparation
of the banknotes that will become the single currency.m In general, the EMI is
performing its role as an "interim institution"-a sort of "John the Baptist"
preparing the way of the ECB-in a highly effective manner, although
somewhat handicapped by the Rome IGC's decision not to give it operational
monetary control powers, which are reserved to the ECB.m
Because 1994 marked the start of recovery from the serious 1992-1993
recession that affected the entire Community, the prospects for successful
attainment of an EMU then began to improve. As previously noted, the Turin
European Council, held in March 1996, did not include any change in the TEU
provisions on the EMU on the IGC agenda, with the result that the Amsterdam
Treaty makes no change in that regard. Government leaders certainly realize that
attaining the requisite convergence criteria demands hard effort and some
unpopular measures, but they also appear to recognize the high economic and
political costs of failing to create an EMU. Successive European Council
meetings in 1995-1997, especially those of Madrid, Dublin and Amsterdam, took
several key policy decisions concerning the planning for the third stage,229 and
directed the Commission, the Council and the EMI to make further efforts to
achieve the EMU in accordance with the EC Treaty timetable.
Deciding that Member States must meet certain economic and monetary
standards in order to join in EMU is one thing; helping them to do so is quite
another. Already in the Commission's August 21, 1990 communication on EMU,
the Commission laid great stress on the need to develop an effective system of
cooperation between the Community as a whole and individual Member States,
notably the elaboration of pluriannual economic policy guidelines and
multilateral surveillance of budgetary performance.3 ° This basic approach was
early agreed upon in the Rome IGC and detailed provisions for the execution of
cooperative multilateral surveillance were inserted into the EC Treaty itself.231
226 For a description of the EMI's activities since its creation, see Commission, General Report
1994, supra note 22, at point 38; European Commission, General Report on the Activities of the
European Union 1995, at points 70-75 (1996) [hereinafter Commission, General Report 1995]; and
Commission, General Report 1996, supra note 213, at points 84-85.
m This preparatory process is discussed further in Part IX, infra.
2n See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text. Smits also notes that the EM] seems to be
concerned about making some decisions to plan for features of the third stage, because of the
possibility that the ECB, which will represent only the participating states (and not all the Member
States represented in the EM]), might take a different view on the issues involved. Smits, supra note
11, at 48.
2"9 These decisions are described further in Part VIII.A, infra.
2 Commission, Communication on EMU, supra note 39, at 23-25.
231 Italianer, supra note 39, at 71 & 76-77. For a detailed analysis of the Treaty procedures, see
Smits, supra note 11, at 72-74.
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In application of Articles 103 and 104c, the Community has energetically
undertaken the serious coordination of economic and monetary policy, in
particular to give guidance to Member States in the elimination of excessive
deficits and accumulated debt. The Council adopted a series of technical
regulations and decisions in late 1993 in order to make more precise the
standards for avoiding excessive government debt and for the calculation of
financial resources, as well as to oblige Member States to consult the EMI on
any monetary proposals.732 The ban under Article 104 on the direct financing of
government deficits by central banks (popularly referred to as "no more
bailouts") came into effect on January 1, 1994.233
The Commission reviewed the excessive deficit levels that were considered to
prevail in all Member States except Ireland and Luxembourg, and on November
7, 1994 the Council for the first time issued guidelines for corrective action. 234
This process of review and guidance continued in 1995-1997, with the Council
issuing further guidelines for Member States whose monetary conditions had
deteriorated (e.g., France and Germany), while removing others (Denmark,
Finland and The Netherlands) from the list of those having an excessive
deficit.235 The remarkable level of progress that several Member States, notably
in the Mediterranean tier, have made toward qualifying for the third stage during
the 1995-1997 period is due in no small measure to the efficacy of this
surveillance and planning procedure, which sets targets in a more objective
fashion. Political leaders may then point to these targets as a means of justifying
unpopular budget saving measures to the general public.
The economic condition of all Member States improved radically in 1995, and
moderately since then. Due in part to this relative economic health, but perhaps
even more to unusually strong political will, most Member States have made
great, and in some instances surprisingly rapid, progress toward attaining the
TEU's mandatory convergence criteria, which now shall be explained in more
detail.
B. The Convergence Criteria
Article 109e(2) prescribes that Member States shall, during the second stage,
adopt "multiannual programmes intended to ensure the lasting convergence
necessary for the achievement of economic and monetary union, in particular
with regard to price stability and sound public finances," and 109e(4) adds that
the Member States "shall endeavor to avoid excessive government deficits."
Articles 104c(2) and 109j(l), supplemented by the Treaty Protocols on the
Excessive Deficit Procedure and on the Convergence Criteria, set in more
232 For a description, see Commission, General Report 1993, supra note 214, at points 22-24.
"I Smits discusses the vital nature of this rule in Smits, supra note 11, at 74-77.
21 Commission, General Report 1994, supra note 22, at point 36.
235 Bull. EU 5-1997, at 16. On September 15, 1997, the Ecofin Council made recommendations to
nine Member States to incite them to remedial action to eliminate excessive deficits. Bull. EU 9-
1997, at 9.
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specific terms the economic and monetary conditions Member States must meet
for eligibility to participate in the third stage of monetary union.
Three of these conditions, set fairly early in the Rome Intergovernmental
Conference, have proved surprisingly attainable. The first is "a high degree of
price stability," measured by the attainment of an inflation rate close to that of
the three best performing Member States in terms of price stability.2' The text is
somewhat ambiguous: it is not clear whether the point of reference should be the
average inflation level of the three best performing states, or the inflation rate of
the poorest among the three best performing states.237 However, the use of the
word "close" to that level permits a degree of flexibility in application in any
event. Article 1 of the Protocol on Convergence Criteria 38 specifies that "close"
shall mean that the target inflation rate should be one not in excess of 1.5%
above the inflation rate of the three best performing States, using the "consumer
price index on a comparable basis" to gauge the inflation rate.
In the period 1994-1997, the Member States made highly satisfactory progress
in lowering their inflation rates, in some cases to one half or one third of their
prior level. By the end of 1996, the Commission estimated the average inflation
rate of all Member States at slightly above 2 .6 %,239 and the Commission expects
that figure to drop to around 2.1% in 1997. 2o The average inflation rate for the
three best performing Member States was around 1.5%, and should stay around
that level in 1997. By the end of 1996, the Commission concluded that ten
states were within the required inflation rate range,2" and by the end of 1997
only Greece is certain to have an excessive inflation rate (and even Greece has
made significant progress in this regard).242
Closely connected to the inflation rate criterion is the second one, requiring
Member States' long term interest rates to attain a level not exceeding by more
than 2% the level of the three best performing states?' 3 Long term interest rates
tend to move in tandem with inflation rates (although not invariably), and these
rates fell throughout the Community in 1994-1997. The Commission viewed
eleven Member States as satisfying this criterion in 1996.244 By the end of 1997,
23 Italianer informs us that the precise text, with the percentage figures, was worked out in
October 1991. Italianer, supra note 39, at 99.
237 Smits argues for the use of the average inflation rate. Smits, supra note 11, at 124. This seems
the most likely to be adopted.
2m Protocol on the Convergence Criteria Referred to in Article 109j of the Treaty Establishing the
European Community, annexed to the TEU.
23 Commission, General Report 1996, supra note 213, at point 62.
wo The Community Economy in 1997-99--Autumn 1997 Economic Forecasts, Commission Press
Release, October 1997, at 1 [hereinafter Commission Press Release].
241 Commission, General Report 1996, supra note 213, at point 72.
24 Greece's inflation rate is expected to drop from 8.5% in 1996 to 3.5% in 1999. Commission
Press Release, supra note 240, at 3.
203 Protocol on the Convergence Criteria, Article 5.
24 Commission, General Report 1996, supra note 213, at point 72.
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only Greece is fairly certain to have long term interest rates exceeding by 2%
the average level (slightly above 6%) of the three best performing states.24 5
The third criterion is that a Member State's currency must remain within "the
normal fluctuation margins provided for by the exchange rate mechanism of the
European Monetary System without severe tensions for at least the last two
years before the examination". 246 Neither the EC Treaty nor the Protocol
specifically require that Member States formally adhere to the Exchange Rate
Mechanism 247-an important point, since Finland joined and Italy rejoined the
ERM in October and November 1996 respectively,24 and Greece, Sweden and
the U.K. continue to remain outside the ERM. As was noted in Part II above,
the exchange markets have been quite stable since mid-1995.2 9 Satisfaction of
this criterion is expected for all Member States, with the possible exception of
Greece.
The fourth and by far the most difficult criterion is that Member States must
not have an excessive deficit. Under Article 104c and Article 1 of the Protocol
on the Excessive Deficit Procedure, 2  this criterion has two aspects: (1) the
current annual government deficit should not exceed 3% of the national gross
domestic product (GDP) at market prices; and (2) the accumulated total
government debt should not exceed 60% of GDP. Article 2 of the Protocol
specifies that key terms are defined in accordance with the usage of the
European System of Integrated Economic Accounts and that, in particular, the
term "government" includes "central government, regional or local government
and social security funds, to the exclusion of commercial operations." This
definition is especially important for the calculation of total government debt of
federal states, since their component states or regions often have substantial
debt.
The idea that Member States must not have an excessive deficit in order to
qualify for the third stage was accepted early on,251 but the setting of a yardstick
to measure such deficits proved to be a difficult task. The exact terms were still
not set in the June 1991 Luxembourg Presidency draft and were only agreed
upon in October on the basis of a Monetary Committee study.252 In view of the
traditional use of deficit financing by many Member States to meet current
245 These figures are not yet available for 1997. The text estimate is based on a report,
Convergence Situation of Potential EMU Members, produced monthly by Deutsche Morgan Grenfell.
2* EC Treaty, art. 109j(l) and Protocol on the Convergence Criteria, Article 3.
20 Smits holds the contrary view that formal participation of Member States in the ERM "seems
to follow" from the text. Smits, supra note 11, at 126. With all due deference to his expert opinion,
it would seem implausible, and politically impossible, for the other Member States to exclude
Finland or Italy from participation in the third stage in the Article 109j decision that will occur in
May 1998 only because they did not join the ERM until October or November 1996.
24 Commission, General Report 1996, supra note 213, at point 76.
m Id. at point 77.
2-1 Protocol on the Excessive Deficit Procedure, annexed to the TEU.
233 The Commission's August 21, 1990 Communication on EMU urged that this principle, with a
"yardstick" to measure it, should be set in the Treaty. Commission, Communication on EMU, supra
note 39, at 25.
232 Italianer, supra note 39, at 82.
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social and economic needs, and the enormous accumulated government debt
loads of several states, the excessive deficit criterion was always recognized as
the "make or break" factor in qualification for the final stage.
Although almost all Member States made remarkable progress in 1995-1997
toward reducing their annual deficit and lowering their accumulated total debt,
nonetheless, many would be unable to meet the Protocol criteria if these were to
be applied strictly. This is especially true for the total debt aspect, because
several Member States have attained extremely high levels in the past. Thus, at
the end of 1996, Belgium, Greece and Italy had total debt levels well in excess
of 100% of GDP, and Austria, Ireland, The Netherlands and Sweden all had
debt levels in excess of 70% of GDP.5 3
Fortunately, the drafters of the relevant TEU Treaty provisions foresaw the
need for a certain degree of flexibility. Article 109j(l) stipulates that Member
States must not have an excessive deficit, but that provision cross-references to
Article 104c(6), which gives the Council the responsibility for deciding "after an
overall assessment whether an excessive deficit exists." The Council in turn
works on the basis of a Commission report which need only find, according to
Article 104c(2), that the current annual deficit "has declined substantially and
continuously" and is "close to the reference level," and that the total
accumulated government debt "is sufficiently diminishing and approaching the
reference value at a satisfactory pace."
Accordingly, both the Commission in its report and the Council in its final
decision may conclude that a Member State's sustained progress toward meeting
the Protocol levels is sufficient, even though the state has not yet attained the
required levels. 25 4 It is noteworthy that the Council decided in 1997 that
Denmark, Ireland and The Netherlands do not have an excessive deficit,2 5 even
though all three states still have accumulated government debts in excess of 60%
of GDP, because all three have continuously and significantly reduced the total
government debt.
C. Current Prospects
The relative flexibility in applying the Protocol standards is extremely
important because in early 1997 the severe unemployment rates in several
Member States (which continue to exceed 10% throughout the Community, and
currently exceed 13% in France and Spain), together with other economic
problems (notably the continued cost to Germany of its financial aid to former
East Germany), have compelled several Member States to incur budget costs that
make it rather doubtful that they will precisely hit the Protocol targets by the
253 Estimates vary-the text figures are based on Deutsche Morgan Grenfell reports on the
Convergence Situation of Prospective EMU Members.
254 Smits declares that both the Commission and the Council may go beyond the quantitative
reference criteria and make a qualitative judgment on the degree of compliance of a State with the
criteria. Smits, supra note 11, at 79.
255 Bull. EU 5-1997, at 16. The Council decision specifically added Finland and The Netherlands
to the list of States without an excessive deficit, joining Denmark, Ireland and Luxembourg.
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end of 1997. Indeed, when the new French Socialist government of Prime
Minister Jospin won its surprising victory in June 1997, it announced its
intention to giving the battle against high unemployment a higher priority than
meeting the deficit criterion, although it subsequently reaffirmed its intention to
meet the Maastricht Treaty convergence criteria.
Despite the manifest unhappiness of Germany's Bundesbank with the
prospect, it appears likely that the Community leaders will be relatively lenient
in 1998 when they assess how closely Member States must come to the deficit
and debt target figures. Several Member States may barely meet or marginally
exceed the 3% annual deficit criterion, in some instances (as in France and Italy)
by the use of extraordinary sales of state assets or unusual taxes. Article 109j(4)
stipulates that in early 1998, the Council acting in the composition of Heads of
State or Government, based on Commission and EMI reports, must decide which
Member States meet the convergence criteria, and accordingly move to the third
stage of the monetary union. France attempted to have the June 1997
Amsterdam European Council delay this date, but without success. 256 Most
observers, including financial market experts, currently expect that the Council
will consider that almost all Community States will be deemed to meet the
convergence criteria, with the exception of Greece.
At the time of the Danish referendum in May 1993, Denmark exercised its
opt-out right stipulated in a TEU Protocol, but the current Danish government is
believed likely to move for reconsideration of the issue in a referendum at some
auspicious point after the third stage begins. Similarly, the Labor government of
Prime Minister Blair in the U.K. announced in late 1997 its intention to exercise
the U.K. opt-out granted by its Protocol, but to try to secure popular support for
U.K.'s entry into the third stage of EMU no later than the date of the next U.K.
election (hence, no later than May 2002).257
The Swedish government presently does not desire to join the third stage.
Although Sweden is quite likely to satisfy the convergence criteria, Sweden has
not made its central bank independent and accordingly technically does not
satisfy a Treaty-based criterion for joining. At present it appears that the other
Member States will acquiesce in Sweden's failure to take the necessary measure
to join the third stage. This is rather surprising, considering the insistence that
Sweden and the other applicant states must consider the joining of EMU as a
non-negotiable condition for their accession in 1995, but presumably it is now
politically unpalatable to pressure Sweden into joining, or for that matter to take
any legal action against Sweden. 25
m The Amsterdam European Council reaffirmed the January 1, 1999, starting date for the third
stage and confirmed the early 1998 time frame for Article 109j decisions. Bull. EU 6-1997, at 10-11.
See the text accompanying note 267, infra.
573 See Warren Hoge, Britain Delays Early Entry into the Euro, N.Y. Times, October 28, 1997, at
All; Youssef M. Ibrahim, Change of Heart About Joining the Euro Hands Blair a Setback, N.Y.
Times, October 21, 1997, at A9.
258 Permitting Sweden to opt out without any Treaty Protocol to this effect represents an
unfortunate acceptance of the "Europe A la carte" mentality. Presumably, if the Commission or
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Accordingly, the current prospect is that a large majority of Member States,
probably eleven (excluding Denmark, Greece, Sweden and the U.K.), will begin
the third stage of monetary union on January 1, 1999, the date set by Article
109j(4). This has a number of important consequences. Politically, this is quite
desirable, because it will reduce the tensions inevitably produced by a "two-
tier" Europe, tensions that would be particularly severe if all the Mediterranean
states failed to join. With regard to the Member States that don't join in 1999,
there is a good prospect that all will join by or around 2002 (even Greece has
pledged to meet the criteria by that date). Given the enormous economic,
monetary and even political ramifications of participation in the final stage of
monetary union, it is of capital importance that ultimately all Member States
join in the venture. Moreover, most of the Eastern European states that are
scheduled to begin negotiations in 1998 to join the Union are also reasonably
likely to be capable of joining the monetary union as well by the date of their
accession (which in any event is unlikely to be earlier than 2002).
From a monetary point of view, the addition of a number of Member States
that traditionally have not had strong economies, or that have often been willing
to incur substantial government deficits, may well mean that the monetary union
will not be as fully committed to strict monetary policies as Germany and The
Netherlands have been. Consequently, the new single currency may well fail to
match the traditional strength of the German mark or the Dutch guilder. That is
certainly the forecast of most financial market experts presently. (In Part II
above, it was noted that both the dollar and the U.K. pound have markedly
appreciated against all the continental Community states' currency in 1997, in
part because of concern about the future strength of those apt to be replaced by
the euro.) This possible adverse result, however, should be more than balanced
by the fact that an EMU composed of all, or virtually all, the Member States
will maximize the market benefits of greater cost and price transparency and
more efficient competition, already mentioned in Part I above. Moreover, if the
entire Community is within the EMU, more economic and monetary resources
will be available to the ECB and the Community political institutions to confront
the problems posed by temporary recession or high unemployment in some
Member States. Although economists are divided in their assessment of the level
of risk that some states are more prone to asymmetric economic shocks than
others, the risk of such shocks is certainly genuine. If all the Member States,
including those with relatively sound economies, such as Denmark, Sweden and
the U.K., are part of EMU, central planning to confront crises may well be
easier to execute and to carry out.
another Member State had the political will to do so, an action could be brought against Sweden
under Article 175 for its failure to act to satisfy Articles 108 and 109e(5).
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VIII. POLICY DECISIONS AND MEASURES TO PREPARE FOR EMU
A. European Council Policy Decisions
During 1995-1997, the Commission and the European Monetary Institute
worked intensively to prepare reports, studies and draft proposals for the policy
decisions and regulatory measures necessary to successfully prepare in time for
the shift to the third stage of EMU in 1999. The Council, working usually in its
composition of finance ministers (the "Ecofin Council"), generally approved the
proposed initiatives, although often with significant modifications. The most
serious issues were transmitted to the European Council for determination,
sometimes by compromises, at its regular meetings.
The first series of major policy decisions were taken by the Madrid European
Council in December 1995. This meeting endorsed the "scenario for the
changeover to the single currency," largely as proposed by the Commission and
the EMI.259 Since press reports suggested that Italy and Spain were inclined to
prefer a delay in the inauguration of the final stage of EMU, the European
Council's determination to accept the proposed scenario, strongly advocated by
Germany, represented a significant policy decision. The European Council also
adopted the name, "euro," for the banknotes and largest denomination coins for
the new single currency, considering the name to be "simple" and to"symbolize Europe" while being easy to use in all languages. (The name
"ECU" was rejected because of fears that investors who had lost money
through their purchase of ECU-denominated securities, in comparison to the
stronger dollar or mark-denominated securities, would not have total confidence
in a currency using the ECU name.3)
The scenario, or timetable, called for the preparation of all essential draft texts
by the end of 1996, and for their revision and approval in 1997-1998. As soon
as possible after the determination of the Member States qualifying for entry
into the third stage in early 1998, those states should select the Executive Board
and the central bank governors constituting the Governing Council of the ECB.
The ESCB and the ECB should then begin preliminary operations. In 1998, the
Council and the ESCB should complete the adoption of secondary legislation
and start the production of euro banknotes and coins.
On January 1, 1999, the formal date of commencement of the third stage, the
critical legislation should enter into force, notably that irrevocably fixing the
rates for conversion from national currencies into the euro, and that on
continuity of contracts. During 1999-2001, the euro would be used for
Community and participating Member State accounts, loans and inter-state
financial transactions. A Council regulation should provide a "legal framework"
m5 Bull. EU 12-1995, at 24-28; Commission, General Report 1995, supra note 226, at points 42-
44.
2m Smits, supra note 11, at 491 n.19. Smits not only considers the change to be improper, because
taken by the European Council instead of through a Treaty amendment, but also unfortunate since
"the name 'ecu' had historical roots and sounded much better than the horrid and unimaginative
name 'euro.' " Id. at 492. The latter comment is certainly widely shared.
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for the use of the euro beginning in 1999. Private parties might use the euro in
their transactions starting in 1999, but would not be required to do so (the
principle commonly known as "no prohibition, no compulsion. '- 261) The euro
banknotes and coins should be introduced and become legal tender on January 1,
2002, and national currency should cease to be legal tender no later than June
30, 2002.
The December 1995 Madrid European Council scenario was of capital
importance in the evolution toward EMU. It marked the end of any hesitation
produced by the prior recession and turmoil in the currency exchange markets
during 1991-1994. The approach adopted in the scenario was pragmatic, clear-
cut and established a definite agenda for specific actions. 262 It also represented a
decisive commitment to move ahead toward EMU without any fundamental
change, so that the subsequent March 1996 Turin European Council saw no
reason to place issues concerning EMU on the Turin IGC agenda.263
The next major policy decisions came at the Dublin European Council in
December 19 96.24 The meeting officially confirmed that the third stage of EMU
could not begin early, but would definitely start on January 1, 1999. This
insistence on adherence to the EC Treaty timetable marked the political
determination of Chancellor Kohl of Germany and President Chirac of France in
particular, as several other Member States were inclined to postpone that date.
A major debate in 1996 concerned the Commission's proposed "stability and
growth pact," intended to ensure that Member States would continue to maintain
budget discipline and comply with the deficit criteria after joining the monetary
union. Germany fought vigorously for strict standards,265 while most other
Member States wanted more lenient ones, applied through a political decision,
rather than applied by the Central Bank on purely monetary grounds. The
December 1996 Dublin European Council set a compromise. Its conclusions
directed that a structure be created for systematic, ongoing surveillance of
Member States' budgetary and economic conditions with the goal of anticipating
serious problems and avoiding any need for sanctions. States that nonetheless do
not continue to meet the annual standards are to be sanctioned by being obliged
to pay over a large non-interest bearing deposit equivalent to a sum representing
from 0.2% to 0.5% of their GDP to the European Central Bank, to be kept until
the deficit is reduced, with the risk that the deposit would be forfeited if the
deficit status is not corrected within two years. However, the Council should
211 Id. at 132.
22 Smits describes the Madrid scenario as "relatively simple and user-friendly, [ensuring] an
efficient change-over without competitive distortions." Id.
23 See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
264 Bull. EU 12-1996, at 10 & 20-30; Commission, General Report 1996, supra note 213, at points
69-71.
m The initial idea came in a German Ministry of Finance proposal in late 1995, which was taken
up but modified by the Commission in view of the position taken in preliminary discussions in the
Monetary Committee and the Ecofin Council. See Smits, supra note 11, at 84-85.
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have the power to waive this sanction for Member States suffering a severe
recession or other economic crisis.m
The Dublin European Council also endorsed the proposal from the Econfm
Council and the EMI for a new Exchange Rate Mechanism, ERM H, to govern
relations between the Member States joined in EMU's third stage and those
remaining outside. This was obviously a topic of considerable sensitivity. The
proposal does not require any Member State to join in ERM HI. Those that do
join will only be obliged to keep their currencies within a relatively wide band,
presumably the present ±15% range.
At the June 1997 Amsterdam European Council meeting, an effort by the
newly-elected French Socialist government of Prime Minister Jospin to retard
the 1999 target for the third stage was firmly rejected by the other Member
States. The meeting reaffirmed the need to act early in 1998 to set the number
of participating Member States and to create the ESCB. The meeting also
endorsed the text of the key pieces of secondary legislation, the formal structure
of ERM 11, and the technical decisions on the design of the euro coins.2 7
The December 1997 Luxembourg European Council meeting endorsed the
further progress on the legislative front, and urged that more rapid action be
taken in 1998. Thus, it requested Member States to present their final 1997
statistics in February 1998, that the Commission and the EMI issue their reports
on the Member States' convergence levels in March, and stipulated that the final
decision on the identity of the participating Member States should be taken in
May 1998.268 The European Council likewise reaffirmed the importance of
ongoing coordination of national economic policies in the final stage.
Thus the stage is now set for the critical final series of policy and structural
decisions to be taken in 1998 to launch the third stage of EMU. As previously
indicated, although the statistics are apt to show that several Member States
(notably France, Germany and Italy) are very close to the wire in meeting the
convergence criteria, it is expected that the Commission and EMI reports will be
somewhat liberal in applying the Treaty and Protocol standards. At the Council
meeting scheduled for May 1-3, 1998, the Council in its extraordinary
composition of Heads of State and Government will decide which Member
States qualify for entry into the third stage. All Member States will vote on this
issue. Naturally, only the states qualifying for the third stage will participate in
the designation of the Executive Board members and the national central bank
governors, who together will comprise the ECB, whose creation should take
place shortly thereafter.
216 For a more detailed summary, see id. at 86-90. In Smits' appraisal, although he considers the
structure politically necessary, he deplores this "further intrusion of the European Council in an area
reserved for the Community institutions." Id. at 90.
267 Bull. EU 6-1997, at 9-10 & 20-21.
2" Luxembourg European Council, Press Release on the Presidency Conclusions, Dec. 14, 1997.
The text has not yet been printed in the EU Bulletin.
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B. Essential Measures for EMU
Turning to the regulatory measures adopted to facilitate the progress toward
EMU, a matter of great concern since the Delors Report has been the degree of
differences between Member States in their computation of key statistics. In
1991, a committee on monetary, financial and balance of payment statistics was
created to try to improve the consistency and reliability of statistics in that field,
and in 1992 the Commission adopted a priority program for action to achieve
reliable and comparable statistics for the period 1993-1997.m Undoubtedly the
most important single measure adopted in this field is Council Regulation EC
2494/95 on harmonized indices of consumer prices.? This regulation set up a
system to improve the comparability of consumer prices in Member State
statistics, imposed an obligation to provide "honest and complete
information, " 271 required monthly production of source data, and created a
structure for the compilation of a European Index of Consumer Prices by the
Commission. Obviously, the need to ensure accurate national consumer price
statistics is critical for the ultimate assessment of the number of Member States
that meet the price stability criterion for entry into the third stage.
The Dublin European Council's policy decision on the nature of the "stability
and growth pact" has been carried out by the adoption of two regulations, both
on July 7, 1997. The first, Council Regulation EC 1466/97 on the surveillance
of budgetary positions and economic policies, 2 72 is intended, as its name
suggests, to improve the flow of economic information from Member States to
the Commission and Council, and thereby to improve the surveillance of the
states' economic and monetary positions. Each state participating in the final
stage of EMU must adopt annually a Stability Program, consisting of medium-
term budgetary objectives which show the state's budget to be in surplus or at
least close to balance, and which provide relevant data and assumptions on
economic developments. m These State Stability Programs are to be assessed by
the Commission and the Council.274 The Council may, if it has concerns, provide
recommendations intended to serve as an "early warning" to the Member State
to make adjustments."5 The Council has the discretion to decide whether to
make its recommendations public (a step that might well create greater pressure
upon the Member State in question). A similar approach is to be followed for
non-participating Member States to monitor their progress toward satisfying the
convergence criteria.276 The Regulation is to enter into effect on July 1, 1998,
m9 Commission, General Report 1992, supra note 26, at point 58. For recent developments, see
Commission, General Report 1996, supra note 213, at points 97-98.
270 1995 O.J. (L 257) 1. Commission Regulation EC 1749/86, OJ. (L 229) 3, provides
implementing measures to help carry out the Council Regulation.
27 1995 OJ. (L 257) 1, at art. 7.
m 1997 O.. (L 209) 1.
See Council Regulation EC 1466/97, art. 7.
274 See id. at art. 5.
See id. at art. 6.
276 See id. at arts. 7-10.
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essentially coinciding with the creation of the ESCB and the final preparations
for the third stage.
The second measure, Council Regulation EC 1467/97 on the implementation
of the excessive deficit procedure,m provides the legal force and the details for
execution of the Dublin European Council policy decision. This regulation,
citing EC Treaty Article 104c, notes the obligation upon Member States
participating in the final stage of EMU to continue to avoid excessive deficits. If
the Council decides that a participating Member State has an excessive deficit,
the Council shall promptly recommend corrective measures.m" If the state fails
to take effective action expeditiously, the Council may impose a sanction in the
form of a non-interest bearing deposit equivalent to at least 0.2% of the state's
GDP, with possible higher levels of sanction as a function of the size of the
state's deficit.27 9 This deposit shall "as a rule" be converted into a non-
recoverable fine if within two years, in the opinion of the Council, the excessive
deficit status is not corrected.nn The Council may excuse the excessive deficit if
the Member State has experienced "an annual fall of real GDP of at least 2%,"
or if the state can demonstrate that its annual GDP reduction of less than 2% is
nonetheless sufficiently exceptional in character.28' The system set up for
penalties is obviously intended to constitute a deterrent that would motivate any
Member State to avoid an excessive deficit, or to correct one quite expeditiously.
IX. PREPARATION FOR THE SINGLE CURRENCY, THE EURO
A. Studies and Planning for the Euro
The dimensions of the technical difficulties involved in creating a single
currency were outlined in a 1994 Commission Communication, "Practical
problems involved in introducing the ecu as the European Union's single
currency. "2 The Commission provided a longer study in its 1995 Green Paper
on the Introduction of the Single Currency.283 Both rejected a "big bang" rapid
introduction in favor of a carefully regulated preparation over three years,
followed by a several month transition period for the actual introduction of the
single currency.
The studies note that the banking industry and the financial sector will require
massive revision of denominations of loans, deposits, security instruments and
operating procedures, and that automatic teller machines must be modified,
computer software programs revised, and so on. Public administrators, especially
the tax, social security and budgetary authorities, will likewise have serious
problems in restructuring, while in the private sector the retail industry will need
- 1997 OJ. (L 209) 6.
m Council Regulation EC 1467/97, art. 3.
m See id. at art. 12.
22 See id. at art. 13.
281 See id. at art. 2.
2 1994 OJ. (C 153) 3.
n3 Green Paper, supra note 3, summarized in Commission, General Report 1995, supra note 226,
at point 43.
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to revise operations substantially. Since 1995, the Commission, together with the
European Monetary Institute, has encouraged studies and conferences to involve
as many interested parties as possible in the process of planning and concrete
preparation. Thus, a roundtable conference organized by the Commission in
January 1996 was attended by 500 representatives of all the sectors concerned
and resulted in guidelines for private sector action.2 4 The most recent major
Commission study is its October 1, 1997 Communication on Practical Aspects of
the Introduction of the Euro, advising both public authorities and the private
sector on the manifold measures necessary in 1999-2002 to ensure a smooth
transition to the euro.m
In accordance with the timetable approved by the December 1995 Madrid
European Council, on January 1, 1999 the Member States participating in the
final stage of monetary union will permanently freeze their national currencies
into the until then merely nominal single currency, the euro. In fact, to provide
greater stability to the financial markets, the December 1997 Luxembourg
European Council instructed the Council to decide on the precise conversion rate
for each participating national currency in early May 1998.2
As noted previously, in the three-year period from 1999 to 2001, the
participating Member States will use the euro for all national budgetary and
accounting purposes, will float their debt only in euros, and will use euros for
their inter-state monetary movements. In effect, the national currencies of these
states will exist only as expressions, or sub-units, of the euro as the official
currency. As the Green Paper states, the euro "becomes a currency in its own
right, for which the national currencies are perfect substitutes, i.e., different
denominations of the single currency."'
Financial institutions must operate in euros in their dealings with central
banks and on an inter-bank basis. Commercial enterprises will be encouraged to
use the euro as much as possible in their internal accounts and external
transactions, but will not be required to do so-the principle is one of "no
prohibition, no compulsion." Many large multi-national groups, especially in
Germany and The Netherlands (e.g., Daimler-Benz, Phillips and Siemens), have
already announced their intention to do so. Thus, they will set up their internal
accounts on a dual basis, keeping them both in euros and in their national
currency, will float their debt predominantly in euros, and will invoice and
accept payment in euros as well as in national currency. Many banks are
likewise expected to handle client deposit and loan accounts on a dual euro/
national-currency basis, which should help in the process of familiarizing the
general public with the new currency. London and other financial centers are
expected immediately to trade securities denominated in euros.
2S4 Commission, General Report 1996, supra note 213, at point 74.
m COM (97) 491 final (OcL 1997), summarized in Bull. EU 10-1997, at 13-14.
m See also supra note 268 and accompanying text.
21 Green Paper, supra note 3, at 18.
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To advance planning in the capital markets, the Commission issued in July
1997 the Giovannini Report, proposed by financial sector experts.2 Note that all
enterprises organized in corporate form must redenominate their capital,
securities and debt in euros no later than June 30, 2002. Many are engaged in
advance planning. Commission studies have suggested that all Member States
create the legal possibility of no-par shares to facilitate this changeover. The
process may produce tax consequences in some states, which will probably
necessitate specific legislative treatment.
Because it will take several years to print and safely store the enormous
number of new euro banknotes to issue as legal tender on January 1, 2002, the
EMI has moved rapidly to fulfill its role, foreseen in EC Treaty Article 109f(3),
of setting the technical specifications for the banknotes. 2 9 An April 1995 EMI
report set the denominations at 5, 10, 20, 50 and 100. After detailed studies and
a competition in mid-1996 to select the design for each face of the banknotes,
the EMI decided to use non-existent monuments and bridges with a European
cultural flair on the banknote faces, together with the European flag. 29 Each
denomination will have a different size, a different color and will have tactile
qualities to help the visually impaired to differentiate them.
Article 105a of the EC Treaty gives the Council the power to determine the
nature of euro coins. The process of setting their denominations and features is
now well advanced. The Commission proposed a draft Council regulation on the
denominations and technical specifications of euro coins, 291 which, incidentally,
must be reviewed by the Parliament under the cooperation procedure. This text
proposes one and two euro coins, and 1, 2, 5, 10, 20 and 50 cent coins. The
draft sets their shape, size, color and edges, and notes that the vending machine
association representatives and the European Blind Union were duly consulted to
ensure that the coins would be as suitable as possible for convenient and safe
use. Since the June 1997 Amsterdam European Council has given its
endorsement to the Commission draft,292 the Council should adopt the final
regulation soon.
B. Essential Measures for the Creation of the Euro
The most important measure necessary to launch the single currency is still in
draft form, a proposed regulation on the introduction of the euro. 23 This must
remain a draft, because it is to be adopted using EC Treaty Article 109 1 (4) as
its legal basis, which means that action must be taken by the Council in a
special body representing the participating Member States after they are
The report is contained in the Commission Communication on the Impact of the Euro on
Capital Markets, COM (97) 337 final (July 1997), summarized in Bull. EU 7/8-1997, at 15-16.
29 Commission, General Report 1996, supra note 213, at point 84.
Selection of the Euro Banknote Designs, EMI Press Release, Dec. 13, 1996.
1997 OJ. (C 208) 5.
Bull. EU 6-1997, at 9.
293 1997 OJ. (C 236) 8. The text was substantially modified and made more detailed in its review
by the Council and the Parliament. For the Commission's initial proposal, see 1996 OJ. (C 369) 10.
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designated, presumably in May 1998, and after the ECB is constituted and can
give its opinion on the text. However, in view of the critically important nature
of the draft, and to promote legal certainty, the European Council meeting at
Amsterdam in June 1997 took the unusual step of adopting a specific resolution
endorsing the draft text.294
The draft regulation on the introduction of the euro essentially would give
legal force to the policy decisions reached by the Madrid European Council in
December 1995. Article 2 adopts the name, euro, for the single currency, and
divides one euro into one hundred cents. Article 3 prescribes that the euro is to
be substituted for national currency units at the irrevocable fixed rates to be set
by the Council pursuant to Article 109 1 (4). (As noted above, this is now
scheduled to occur in May 1998.) The euro is then to be the unit of account for
the ECB and all participating national central banks.
Articles 10-11 of the draft regulation mandate the ECB to put euro banknotes
into circulation on Jan. 1, 2002 at the latest, and the Member States to issue
euro and cent coins at the same date, both assuming the status of legal tender.
Under Article 15, national currency banknotes and coins may remain legal
tender for no longer than six months thereafter. Article 12 requires participating
states to "ensure adequate sanctions against counterfeiting" of euros.
The transition period, 1999-2001, is covered in Articles 6-9 of the draft
regulation, which provide essentially that all legal instruments (laws, regulatory
or administrative acts, judicial decisions, contracts, instruments of payment, etc.)
may be set either in euros or in a national currency. Acts to be performed under
the instrument (e.g., payment under a sales contract) are then to be carried out in
the currency specified-but subject to anything the parties involved may agree
(thus adopting the principle of private party autonomy). However, a debtor
always has the option to pay a creditor either in euros or the national currency.
Member States may redenominate their prior outstanding debt into euros, but
they are not obligated to do so. They may also permit organized markets (e.g.,
stock or commodities exchanges) to change their units of account from the prior
national currency to euros.
Of equal importance, and finally adopted, is Council Regulation EC 1103/97
on certain provisions relating to the introduction of the euro. 295 This is
commonly known as the Article 235 Regulation, because it was adopted by use
of Article 235 of the EC Treaty, since the monetary provisions of the TEU set
no legal basis for it. It is also known as the "continuity of contracts regulation,"
because that is its principal subject. Although a Recital to the Regulation notes
that "it is a generally accepted principle of law that the continuity of contracts
and other legal instruments is not affected by the introduction of a new
1997 OJ. (C 236) 7.
1997 OJ. (L 162) 1. The initial Commission draft is in 1996 OJ. (C 369) 8. For a thorough
discussion (but prior to the final Regulation text) of the continuity of contract and other issues
involved in the creation of the euro, see D. Dunnet, Some Legal Principles Applicable to the
Transition to the Single Currency, 33 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 1133 (1996) and V. Wolker, The
Continuity of Contracts in the Transition to the Third Stage of Economic and Monetary Union, 33
Common Mkt. L. Rev. 1117 (1996).
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currency," nonetheless "in order to reinforce legal certainty and clarity," the
Regulation was adopted. Another Recital expresses the hope that third country
jurisdictions will accept and apply the principles set in the Regulation, because
its terms represent the monetary rules of the jurisdiction issuing the currency.
The key provision is Article 3, which states:
The introduction of the euro shall not have the effect of altering any term of a legal
instrument or of discharging or excusing performance under any legal instrument,
nor give a party the right unilaterally to alter or terminate such an instrument. This
provision is subject to anything which parties may have agreed.2
This expressly binding rule of continuity of contracts is meant to bar completely
any claim for rescission, cancellation or non-performance under national law
based on statutory or case law rules on frustration, impossibility, material
alteration of terms, inequity, and so forth. Note however that the principle of
party autonomy is respected: the parties may agree to the contrary. While it is
probably true that the rule of continuity of contracts would have been applied in
national courts in any event, the Regulation will certainly provide clear guidance
to business operators and avoid unnecessary litigation.
Article 2 of the Regulation further specifies that any reference in a legal
instrument to an ECU should be replaced by one to a euro, on a one ECU to
one euro basis. Finally, Article 4 stipulates that conversions from national
currencies into euros shall be made by a calculation with six significant figures,
without any rounding off. This sets a standard with considerable precision.
The Regulation's expressed hope that third countries will respect the principle
of continuity of contracts elaborated in its text has already found a definite
resonance in New York. On July 29, 1997 the New York legislature adopted a
statute on Continuity of Contract which specifically provides that in all contracts
subject to New York law which refer to a European national currency, or to the
ECU, as a subject or medium of payment, the reference should be replaced by a
reference to the euro, if the Member State of the currency is replacing its
currency with the euro.2 97 Similar legislation is pending in California and
Illinois, and may be adopted not only in other U.S. states, but also in foreign
jurisdictions. The value of such legislation lies in the legal certainty thus
provided to the principle of continuity of contracts in the jurisdiction adopting it;
but there is a potential adverse effect if courts in other jurisdictions without such
legislation are led to doubt the principle of continuity of contracts in the absence
of a specific statute.2
Thus, although not all issues have been completely resolved, the basic
structural devices for the introduction of the euro as the new single currency for
all participating Member States have been set as of the end of 1997. Once the
ECB has taken office, the draft regulation on the introduction of the euro can be
29 Council Regulation EC 1103/97, art. 3.
2 McKinney's 1997 Sess. L. S 5049A, amending NY Gen. Oblig. L. § 5-1601.
29 For a careful analytic appraisal, see Michael Gruson, The Introduction of the Euro and Its
Implications for Obligations Denominated in Currencies Replaced by the Euro, 21 Fordham Int'l L.
65 (1997).
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adopted and, during the course of 1998, further accessory legislation and
regulations can be put in place. On January 1, 1999, the euro can then become a
reality.
CONCLUSION
We return to the question posed at the outset of the article: will EMU fly, or,
more realistically, will EMU function well in operation, performing
satisfactorily, although perhaps not at the high level of success some had aspired
for it? At the present time, the end of 1997, the prognosis is favorable.
In order to provide perspective, this Article has traced the genesis and
historical progression in the development of Economic and Monetary Union.
Beginning with the somewhat prophetical Werner Report of 1970 and the
pragmatic achievements of the present European Monetary System, in place
since 1979, the Article has described the aspiration for monetary union, noting
that the latest impetus has come naturally from the success of the internal
market program, launched by the Commission White Paper in 1985.
Appropriate space has been devoted in Part IV to the attainment of free
movement of capital in 1991, a long-sought goal, whose achievement is an
essential pre-condition for monetary union. The unconditional nature of free
movement of capital as set forth in the post-Maastricht EC Treaty Article 73,
authoritatively interpreted in 1995 by the Court of Justice, provides assurance
that this foundation stone for monetary union will not be undermined.
Due tribute has been paid to the seminal 1989 Delors Report, which set out
both the essential features of economic and monetary union and the pragmatic
three stage program for its attainment. This Article has naturally devoted in Part
V considerable detail to the description of the Maastricht Treaty provisions on
the progressive evolution of EMU through the three stages, and upon the
structure, role and powers of the European System of Central Banks and the
European Central Bank. Modeled directly upon the German Bundesbank, and
indirectly upon the Federal Reserve system, the ECB is bound to become a
powerful body within the Community structure, independent in its functioning,
limited only by its obligation to provide reports and accounts of its actions and
by a fairly elaborate system of judicial review.
The article's most important purpose is to provide in Part VI a critical review
of certain constitutional and legal features of monetary union. Placing so many
secondary features of the proposed EMU into the EC Treaty itself, with
constitutional force and the inevitable difficulty in amendment, is quite
questionable. Why the Treaty drafters believed that independence of the ECB
and the national central banks is so critical has been reviewed, but not without
query as to the merit of the total independence prescribed by the Treaty. Linked
to this topic is the issue of democratic legitimacy. The Article presents the
concern, shared with other commentators, that Parliament's proper role as the
voice of the people has been neglected, and points particularly to the unfortunate
omission of Parliamentary assent to the decision on which Member States
qualify for EMU, and upon the designation of ECB executive board members. It
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can only be hoped that Parliament will energetically and effectively undertake its
role in surveillance of the ECB, and that the ECB will prove willing to
cooperate loyally in this process.
In a Community under the rule of law, the importance of judicial review is
capital. The Article discusses the diverse procedures by which the ECB may
solicit the aid of the Court of Justice in protecting its prerogatives, and by
which, conversely, the ECB can be called to account before the Court by
Member States, Community institutions and private parties. "Turf battles" can
be effectively resolved in this manner, and the Court may have to fix the
parameters of ECB or national central bank independence, as well as those for
the obligation of professional secrecy.
Finally, on a highly topical note, this Article discusses the motive for the
Treaty's designation of price stability as the priority goal for the ECB. Despite
the surface plausibility of giving price stability such priority, the Article queries
whether it would not have been more advisable to set out several economic
imperative interests as the ECB goal, on the Federal Reserve model, or to state a
general economic welfare goal, as was done in The Netherlands. In view of the
Amsterdam Treaty's new emphasis on high employment as a Treaty objective,
the Article queries whether the ECB might not be able to make high
employment a preeminent secondary consideration in setting its policies.
The process of qualification for entry into the third stage merited considerable
attention in Part VII, which attempted to describe the complex convergence
criteria set for the Member States, and the nuanced manner in which they might
be ultimately assessed. The Article joins with current sentiment in estimating
that eleven Member States will join the final stage in May 1998, all but
Denmark, Greece, Sweden and the U.K. The opt out provisions for Denmark
and the U.K. are indicated, along with the status of the Member States "with a
derogation" that will (temporarily, we hope) not participate in the third stage.
Finally, the article contends that there is great political value in having as many
Member States as possible in EMU, and that the economic advantages in the
more transparent and economically efficient market place achieved thereby will
outweigh any possible disadvantages in lessened concern for price stability.
In the final two Parts, the article more summarily describes the progress made
by the institutions with the aid of the EMI, and under the policy guidance of the
European Council, since 1995. The specific timetable for further action is in
place, since the December 1995 Madrid European Council. Key regulations have
either been adopted or await adoption in 1998 to ensure a legal framework for
the new single currency, the euro. Although the transition period from 1999 to
2002 will be difficult and very costly, the goal of a single currency is in sight.
This returns us to the first Part, and the anticipated benefits of EMU. No one
can be sure whether the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow will be as large as
initially hoped, but many economic benefits are certain. Member States have
made astonishing progress in taming inflation and budget deficits and are
unlikely to change course radically now. Economic growth is apt to be steadier
and more certain. Central monetary guidance from the powerful ECB can only
be an element of stability and assurance. The internal market's cap in the form
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of transparent trans-border costs and prices and increased European-wide
competition is certain to be attained. The euro may well become a serious
competitor for the dollar on the international monetary stage.
In conclusion, and not least, EMU's political and psychological benefits will
be enormous. Its success will mark a major step toward political unity. The
popular recognition of a European identity will be radically augmented by the
adoption of a common currency.
Of course, many questions remain open and many issues remain to be
resolved before EMU will be complete and judged as a success. Will in fact, the"outs," the Member States not participating in the final stage of EMU in May
1998, be able to, or be willing to join relatively soon, or will the "two-tier"
Europe persist, with pernicious political and economic effects? Will all the
applicant states from central Europe be able to meet the economic standards
required to join EMU, or will this prove to be a serious impediment for some of
them? Will the system of economic surveillance and cooperation after EMU
begins work smoothly, or will there prove to be an occasion for the operation of
the dread sanction system? Will a successful EMU provide impetus for
movement toward new Community endeavors, such as tax harmonization and
agricultural policy reforms? Finally, will it advance significantly the political
agenda in other aspects of the Union?
Only the passage of time can provide the answers, but it is certain that the
Economic and Monetary Union will reshape the future of the European Union.
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